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I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. patent system is built upon a delicate balance between the
rights of patent owners, the rights of the public at large, and the rights of
market competitors. The patentee is granted broad rights to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the patented invention in order to reward

2. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("The Patent
Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science
and useful Arts."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8)).
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the patentee's investment in creating the invention.3 In exchange for the
grant of patent rights, the patentee is required to disclose the details of the
invention in a patent application. 4 This disclosure benefits both the general
public by adding to the store of scientific knowledge,5 and market
competitors by providing information about rival products and processes.6
In essence, the patentee's property rights come at the expense of enabling
challenges to the value of those rights through further scientific advances
and increased competitor know-how. 7 Conversely, the access by the public
and market competitors to the information contained in the patent
application comes at the expense of abiding by limitations upon the use of
that information.'
3. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11 th Cir. 2003) ("This
exclusionary right is granted to allow the patentee to exploit whatever degree of market power it
might gain thereby as an incentive to induce investment in innovation and the public disclosure of
inventions.").
4. See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471,484 (1944) ("As
a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year
monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret.").
5. In reArgoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting
that one of the roles of the enabling provision of the Patent Act is to "provide the assurance that the
public will, in fact, receive something in return for the patent grant. This consideration is, of course,
the full and complete disclosure of how to make and use the claimed invention. Thus, the patent
adds a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public storehouse.").
6. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("First, patent law
seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate
further innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third,
the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain
remain there for the free use of the public."); see also F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 442-43 (2d ed. 1980) (detailing the costs and benefits
of the patent system).
7. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 ("From their inception, the federal patent laws have
embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that
imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy."). The Supreme Court has also observed that:
[w]hen a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the
general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the
general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal that the
Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use
for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the
eventual development of further significant advances in the art.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
8. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
637 (1999) ("'[B]ecause courts have continually recognized patent rights as property, the fourteenth
amendment prohibits a State from depriving a person of property without due process of law."'
(quoting S. REP. No. 102-280, at 8 (1992))). One commentator notes that:
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Experimentation with patented inventions is an activity that is central
to the patent system balance.' On the one hand, if researchers and
competitors are able to use patented inventions for their intended purposes
under the guise of experimentation, then patentees are deprived of
economic benefits and the incentive to invest in inventive activities is
diminished." On the other hand, if the public and competitors are unable
to use patented inventions for genuine experimentation, then scientific
knowledge is retarded and market competition is limited." Today, there12
are two types of experimental use exemptions to patent infringement.
The first, the common law experimental use exemption, was developed
through a long line ofjudicial decisions and applies to all inventions." The
second, the Hatch-Waxman statutory experimental use exemption, was

upon issuance of the patent, as already discussed, the information in the patent is
placed in the public domain. Since [the inventor] independently developed the
process, her public disclosure of the process, via the patent, is analogous to
someone independently developing and disclosing a trade secret. Such behavior
would end the secret status of the trade secret and terminate its existence.
Therefore, the granting of a patent to [the inventor] and the termination of
[another's] property rights in the trade secret are consistent with property theory.
This result also helps to further secure for the public the benefit of the process and
is consistent with an underlying policy of intellectual property law. The public
disclosure that accompanies issuance of a patent provides more benefit to the
public than the public benefit received if the process was maintained as a secret
pursuant to trade secret law.
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition of Property?: A
JurisprudentialAnalysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 648 (1994) (emphasis added).
9. See Lauren C. Bruzzone, The ResearchExemption: A Proposal,21 AIPLA Q.J. 52,53-55
(1993).
Under the exclusionary patent grant, the patent owner could stop a researcher's
activities if the researcher created a copy of the invention on his own and
experimented with that copy. However, to the extent that free access to knowledge
is a requirement for technological progress, this right of the patent owner runs
directly contrary to the avowed purpose of the patent law: the encouragement of
the useful arts and science.
Id. at 54.
10. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56U. CHI. L. REV. 1017,1038-40(1989) (discussing Joseph Schumpeter's belief
that "monopolies are conducive to innovation").
11. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
PatentBargain,2004 WIS. L. REV. 81,91 ("Patent exclusivity, while promoting inventive progress
by providing incentives for innovation, can slow technical progress if the best follow-on inventors
are prevented from building upon the inventive idea during the patent term.").
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.A.
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Congress in 1984 and applies only to drugs and medical
enacted 1 by
4
devices.
Properly reconciling the interests of patentees, the public, and market
competitors has never been more important. 5 Invention of new technology
is critical to the success of U.S. companies, 16 the growth of the U.S.
economy,17 the health and welfare of U.S. citizens," and U.S. competitive
advantage in global trade.19 Perhaps because of its growing importance in
our technology-based society, or perhaps because of its inherent interest
to an array of professionals, experimental use of patented inventions has
been the subject of a great deal of thoughtful scholarship. Writers have
considered the development of both the common law and Hatch-Waxman
experimental use exemptions, reviewed their operation in different
research contexts, discussed enacted and proposed legislative changes,
presented arguments in favor of expanding and contracting the scope of
the experimental use exemptions and, most of all, proposed a myriad of
law reform measures to shape the future development of the experimental
use exemptions.2' This Article will attempt to synthesize the considerable
14. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
15. See Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 55 ("Today, however, the ever increasing importance of
technological development, the increased use of reverse engineering, and the need for common
world-wide patent protection are all substantial motivations for a clearer articulation of standards.")
(citations onitted).
16. See NAT'L SCI. BD., 1 SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS-2002 6-5 (2002). The
report points out that "high-technology industries are driving economic growth around the world."
Id. at 6-6. Within our own borders, "[d]emand for high-technology products in the United States
far exceeds that in any other single country; in 1998, it was larger (approximately $768 billion) than
the combined markets of Japan and the four largest European nations-Germany, the United
Kingdom, France, and Italy (about $749 billion)." Id. at 6-9, 6-9 & fig. 6-7. Also, "U.S. industries
that traditionally conduct large amounts of R&D have met with greater success in foreign markets
than those that are less R&D intensive, and they have been more supportive of higher wages for
their employees." Id. at 6-18.
17. Illustrative of this growth is the fact that from 1995 to 1998, high technology production
on a global level grew at a rate three times as fast as all other manufacturing sectors. Id. at 6-6 fig.
6-1.
18. See id. at 6-23 ("In 1999, corporate patent activity reflected U.S. technological strengths
in medical and surgical devices, electronics, telecommunications, advanced materials, and
biotechnology."). These areas are obviously essential to maintaining a healthy and technologically
advanced society. See id. at tbl. 6-3 (showing that the top fifteen most emphasized patent classes
in the U.S. involve these areas).
19. Id. at 6-11 ("Throughout the 1990s, U.S. exports of advanced technology products
exceeded imports in 8 of 11 technology areas."). Id. at 6-11. Those areas include advanced
materials (semiconductors, optical fiber cable, etc.), aerospace, biotechnology, electronics, flexible
manufacturing, nuclear technology, software products, and weapons. Id. In 1999, trade in advanced
technology products accounted for 29.2% of exports, versus 17.5% of imports, and accounted for
$381 billion out of $1.7 trillion involving U.S. trade in merchandise. Id.
20. See infra Part III. The focus of this section is on the commentary related to the common
law experimental use exemption and not the Hatch-Waxman exemption. The goal of this Article
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scholarship in the field, provide additional context to the debate, and
propose a new statutory experimental use exemption that would treat all
inventions in the same way.
Part I of this Article will discuss the common law and Hatch-Waxman
experimental use exemptions to patent infringement. The discussion of the
common law experimental use exemption will consider the different tests
that courts have developed to distinguish between permissible and
impermissible experimental uses of patented technology and the rationales
that have been advanced in support of these tests. The discussion of the
Hatch-Waxman experimental use exemption will describe the HatchWaxman Act and consider the cases that have arisen under the Act with
special attention to the most recent case, which was decided by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,2 and later reviewed by the U.S.
Supreme Court.22 Part II of this Article will discuss the common law
experimental use exemption in the context of other U.S. and foreign patent
law policies.23 The U.S. patent law policies considered are the policy of
requiring adequate disclosure of the invention in the patent application and
the policy of not allowing the lawful scope of the patent to be expanded by
private contract. The foreign patent law policies considered are the
policies of individual countries and international organizations that
expressly allow for the experimental use of patent subject matter in a
variety of circumstances. Part II of this Article will discuss and critique
the various law reform measures that have been proposed to reconcile the
competing interests in the experimental use of patented technology.24
These law reform measures will be considered in terms of three aspects of
experimental use: the nature of the organization conducting the

is to revise the common law exemption in such a manner that revision or further discussion of the
Hatch-Waxman amendment would not be necessary. However, for commentary relating to HatchWaxman, see generally Laura J. Robinson, Analysis of Recent Proposalsto Reconfigure HatchWaxman, I1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 47 (2003) (discussing the problems inherent in Hatch-Waxman's
thirty-month stay provision, (21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (West 2003)), and concluding that
greater FTC and FDA scrutiny, rather than legislative proposals, would be a far better solution to
current industry abuses); Janet A. Gongola, Note, Prescriptionsfor Change: The Hatch-Waxman
Act and New Legislation to Increase the Availability of Generic Drugs to Consumers, 36 IND. L.
REV. 787 (2003) (arguing that Congress should pass the Drug Competition Act, S. 754, 107th Cong.
(2001), to protect the pharmaceutical industry against anticompetitive agreements made between
brand-name and generic drug manufacturers in response to Hatch-Waxman's convoluted
provisions); Ned Milenkovich, Comment, Deleting the BolarAmendment to the Hatch-Waxman
Act: Harmonizing PharmaceuticalPatentProtection in a Global Village, 32 J. MARSHALLL. REV.
751 (1999) (arguing that the exemption provision of Hatch-Waxman should be eliminated in order
to bring U.S. patent law in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement).
21. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
22. 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
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experimentation, the purpose of the experimentation, and the nature of the
patented technology used in the experimentation. The discussion of the
law reform proposals will be organized from the most limited proposed
exemptions to the broadest proposed exemptions.
Part IV of this Article will propose a new statutory experimental use
exemption. 25 The proposed experimental use exemption would be
asymmetric in nature, and differentiate the patented subject matter that
could be experimentally used by corporations, small businesses, and
nonprofit research organizations. For corporations, the proposed
experimental use exemption would only allow the use of patented subject
matter owned by other corporations. For small businesses and nonprofit
research organizations, the proposed experimental use exemption would
allow the use of patented subject matter owned by corporations, small
businesses, and nonprofit research organizations. The proposed
experimental use exemption would permit the same experimental uses of
all patented subject matter for corporations, small business and nonprofit
research organizations. Those allowed uses would be for the purposes of
education, scientific research, evaluating patent specifications, disclosures
and claims, improving upon the patented subject matter, engineering
around the patented subject matter, and developing competing, noninfringing patent subject matter. Part IV will also describe a means to
distinguish between permissible and impermissible uses of patented
subject matter under the proposed exemption, suggest statutory language
to implement the proposed exemption, and discuss the benefits of the
proposed exemption.

11.

THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTIONS

A. The Common Law Experimental Use Exemption
1. Early Cases
The origin of the common law experimental use exemption to patent
infringement is universally attributed to Justice Story's opinion in
Whittemore v. Cutter.26 In Whittemore, Justice Story stated that "it could
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who
constructed such a [patented] machine merely for philosophical

25. See infra Part IV.
26. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). The origins of the experimental use
exemption have been traced by several other authors. See, e.g., Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 56-57
(exploring the origins of the exemption at common law). However, the origins themselves are a
requisite starting point for any discussion in this area.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

7

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects."" At the time Justice Story wrote
these words in 1813, "philosophical" referred to the field of "natural
philosophy" or what we call today "science. 28 Properly interpreted,
Justice Story's statement contained two distinct experimental use
exemptions to patent infringement: an exemption for using patented
subject matter in order to perform scientific experiments and an exemption
29
for using patented subject matter in order to test its claimed utility.
In Whittemore, Justice Story also addressed two other important
questions regarding patent infringement: the relationship between the
different acts of patent infringement enumerated in the patent statute and
the relationship between damages and patent infringement.3" The Patent
Act of 1800 provided that a patentee could bring an infringement action
against any person who "shall make, devise, use, or sell" a patented
invention without authorization. 3 It was Justice Story's opinion that each
32
of these activities standing alone could constitute an act of infringement.
On the question of whether patent infringement required proof of damages,
Justice Story held that it did not.33 In Justice Story's opinion, "where the
law gives an action for a particular act, the doing of that act imports of
itself a damage to the party. Every violation of a right imports some
damage, and if none other be proved, the law allows a nominal damage." '
Whittmore, therefore, established three fundamental principles of
patent law: the use of patented subject matter for experimentation and
research would be exempted from patent infringement; each individual act
of making, using or selling patented subject matter would constitute patent
infringement; and patent infringement could be established without
showing economic harm to the patentee.35 With respect to the third
principle, it is important to note that the irrelevance of economic harm to
patent infringement does not imply that economic harm is also irrelevant

27. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
28. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 874 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 60
("Story's original version was broader. He saw the exemption as covering 'philosophic
experiments' which, in the nineteenth century, included what we would consider scientific
experiments.").
29. See Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 60 (distinguishing between "'pure research"'
experimentation and "'applied science"' research primarily motivated by potential commercial
application).
30. Whinemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
31. Patent Act of 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37.
32. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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to the experimental use exemption to patent infringement. A patentee need
not show economic harm to establish patent infringement, but a patentee's
failure to show economic harm would have relevance to a claim that the
patented subject matter was used only for experimental purposes; a failure
to show economic harm would be consistent with a claim of experimental
use whereas a showing of economic harm would be inconsistent with such
a claim.36
Justice Story elaborated on his Whittemore opinion in the case of Sawin
v. Guild,37 decided in the same year. In Sawin, Justice Story contrasted the
making of a patented machine with an intent to use it for profit, which
would be an act of infringement, and the making of a patented machine for
the purpose of a scientific experiment or to ascertain the "verity and
exactness of the [patent] specification," which would not be an act of
infringement.3" Justice Story did not fully explain what he meant by using
patented technology for the purpose of profit. His "for profit" test,
however, can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation of the "for
profit" test would eliminate the experimental use exemption for all
business organizations engaged in furtherance of their legitimate
business.39 The rationale for this interpretation would be that the goal of
all business organizations is profit and therefore all of the activities of
business organizations, including experimentation, are in pursuit of that
profit.' A second interpretation of the "for profit" test would allow
business organizations to experiment with patented technology where the
immediate goal was to obtain scientific knowledge or to test patent claims,
but disallow the use of patented technology for its intended purpose in

36. A patentee can show direct damages if the alleged infringer is making or using the
patented subject matter for its intended commercial purpose. On the other hand, if the patentee
cannot show direct damages, it is likely that the alleged infringer is not making or using the
patented subject matter for its intended commercial purpose, but rather for a non-commercial
purpose such as experimentation or research.
37. 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391). Sawin involved the interesting question
of whether the seizure and sale of patented machines by a sheriff pursuant to the execution of a
judgment on a debt would be an infringement of the machine patent. Id. Justice Story held that this
was not an act of infringement, reasoning that to hold otherwise would allow debtors to place
property beyond the "grasp" of creditors by investing their property in patented machines. Id. at
554-55.
38. Id. at 555.
39. See David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16
Hous. J.INT'L L. 615,627 (1994). Sawin can "readily be interpreted to mean that any use that is not
itself a use for profit is not an infringement, with 'philosophical experiment' and 'determining the
adequacy of the disclosure' merely two examples of uses that are not considered 'for profit."' Id.
at 627 (quoting Sawin, 21 F. Cas. at 555).
40. See Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 57 (discussing commercial competitors and noting that
"[tihe very nature of [commercial] defendants undermines any argument that their motives are not
profit related or that their activities will not affect the plaintiff's potential profits.").
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direct revenue-generating activities.41 It is not clear which of these two
interpretations Justice Story had in mind, nor is it clear how Justice Story
viewed the absence of profit intent. Would a nonprofit organization always
be entitled to an experimental use exemption for the use of patented
subject matter in scientific research and testing? Would the lack of a profit
motive exempt a nonprofit organization from patent infringement if it used
patented subject matter outside of the realm of scientific research and
testing? These questions raised by Justice Story's seminal pronouncements
on experimental use would be slowly, and somewhat erratically, answered
over the next one hundred and ninety years.
Later nineteenth-century cases appeared to narrow the experimental use
exemption to patent infringement. An 1861 case defined the experimental
use exemption as the use of patented articles "for the sole purpose of
gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement."42
Whereas Justice Story's conception of experimental use was utilitarian and
envisioned science experiments and testing patent claims, this later
definition appears to allow only for purely fanciful and idle uses of patent
subject matter. Other nineteenth-century cases found that experimenting
with a patented device to determine its suitability for a particular purpose43
and using a patented machine for the purpose of comparing and selling a
competing machine were activities outside the experimental use
exemption.'
41. Consider WiLUAM C. ROBINSON, 3 THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 56
(1890).
[T]he manufacture or the use of the invention may be intended only for other
purposes, and produce no pecuniary result. Thus where it is made or used as an
experiment, whether for the gratification of scientific tastes, or for curiosity, or for
amusement, the interests of the patentee are not antagonized, the sole effect being
of an intellectual character in the promotion of the employer's knowledge or the
relaxation afforded to his mind. But if the products of the experiment are sold, or
used for the convenience of the experimentor, or if the experiments are conducted
with a view to the adaptation of the invention to the experimentor's business, the
acts of making or of use are violations of the rights of the inventor and
infringements of his patent.
Id. (citation omitted).
42. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
Poppenhusen was not decided by Justice Story; however, the language in the case would later be
rephrased as "dilettante" activity and attributed to Justice Story. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
43. See Palmer v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 432,435,438 (1885), affd on othergrounds, 128
U.S. 262 (1888) (holding that the inventor was entitled to damages for the defendant's experimental
use of the inventor's patented knapsack).
44. See Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F. 206, 211 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896) (rejecting
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Three experimental use cases decided in the mid-twentieth century,
however, extended the exemption well beyond "mere amusement." The
first case involved a university.45 In the context of a complicated damages
calculation, the court had to determine whether the use of infringing
machine parts by a university was an act of infringement in which case the
sale of the parts to the university constituted contributory infringement and
would be included in the damages accounting. 4 The court found that the
university had only used the machine parts in conjunction with machines
that were located in a laboratory and that these machines were used only
for experiments.47 The court held that this was not an infringing use that
could support a finding of contributory infringement.48 The second case
involved a company that briefly experimented with a patented machine
and determined that it could not yield a product of satisfactory quality.49
The court held that because the experimental use of the machine occurred
before the company had commenced any commercial production, the use
was not an act of infringement.5 ° The third case involved a competitor
to experiment
device in orderevidence
patented
singlethat
company
the
showedwith
the uncontradicted
court afound
the built
it. 51 Here that
competitor company used the device only to experiment, never
manufactured any devices for sale, and never sold any devices.52 The court
under these facts the use did not infringe the rights of the patent
held that
53
owner.

A case decided in 1976, however, began a reversal of the trend toward
liberal construction of the common law experimental use exemption.54 The
case involved the calculation of damages in an infringement suit against
the United States for the use of patented helicopter rotors and controls.55
The U.S. sought to exclude from the damages calculation its use of the
helicopters for testing and evaluation of such factors as lift ability,
vibration, flight speed, and range. 6 The court concluded that these

an experimental use defense where the machine used for experimentation was also used for profit).
45. Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 700 (D. Colo. 1935) (involving a
dispute over two machines sold to the Colorado School of Mines).
46. Id. at 702-03.
47. Id. at 703.
48. Id. at 713.
49. Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305, 315 (N.D.W. Va. 1937).
50. Id. at 333.
51. Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 230.
54. See Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
55. Id. at 1110.
56. Id. at 1125.
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activities were infringing and therefore compensable.5 In reaching this
conclusion, the court held that testing and evaluation were "intended uses
of the infringing aircraft . .. and are in keeping with the legitimate
business of the using agency.""8 The first holding reversed early case law
that found experimenting with patented subject matter to determine its
suitability for adoption fell within the experimental use exemption. 9 The
second holding created an entirely new limitation on experimental use.
Henceforth, use of patented subject matter for purposes related to the
experimenter's legitimate business would not be allowed under the
experimental use exemption regardless of whether the use was commercial
or non-commercial.' ° The "legitimate business" use limitation on
experimental use would be applied in a case decided twenty-six years later
that would nearly eliminate the common law experimental use exemption
entirely.61
2. Contemporary Cases
The case that irrevocably reversed the liberalization of the
experimental use exemption was Roche v. Bolar,decided in 1984.62 Roche
was the owner of a patent on a drug compound contained in a successful
brand-name drug product.63 Bolar was a generic drug manufacturer.' Prior
to the expiration of Roche's patent, Bolar used the patented drug
compound to perform tests to establish the bioequivalency of its generic
drug to Roche's brand-name drug; bioequivalency tests were necessary to
obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order
to market the generic drug.65 Roche argued that the use of a patented drug
to obtain test data to submit to the FDA was an act of infringement under
the patent laws.' Bolar countered that the use was solely for experimental
purposes and therefore exempt from infringement. 67 The federal district
court found for Bolar, holding that the use of a patented compound for
federally mandated testing was not an act of infringement because the use
57. Id. at 1125-26.
58. Id.
59. See Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305, 333 (N.D.W. Va. 1937).
60. See Parker, supra note 39, at 631 ("[Even if no profit motive is attached to the
experimental activity, the activity will nevertheless be considered an infringement if it is within the
legitimate business of the organization.").
61. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that any use
furthering a legitimate business purpose did not qualify for an experimental use defense).
62. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 860.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 862.
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was de minimis and experimental. 6' The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC) reversed.69
In reaching its conclusion, the CAFC addressed four issues central to
the experimental use exemption. First, citing to two cases that did not
concern experimental use, the CAFC held that the use of a patented
70
invention without either manufacture or sale was an act of infringement.
Second, the court held that a patentee does not have to show any evidence
of damage or lost sales to bring an infringement action. 71 Third, the court
held that Bolar' s experiments were conducted solely for business purposes
and that unlicensed experimentation with a patented invention to adapt the
invention to the experimenter's business is a violation of the patentee's
rights.72 The court's language on this point reveals just how narrowly the
court viewed the experimental use exemption: "[Bolar's experiment] is no
dilettante affair such as Justice Story envisioned. We cannot construe the
experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws
in the guise of 'scientific inquiry,' when that inquiry has definite,
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes. 73
Finally, the court acknowledged that the result of its holding would, in
effect, create a de facto extension of Roche's patent term, but concluded
that it must assume that Congress intended this result by passing both the
Patent Act and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 74 In support of this
assumption, the court noted that the effective life of new drugs may be as
low as seven years because of the required FDA review while the de facto
extension of the patent term may be "upwards" of two years due to
enjoining generic drug testing with a patented compound until the patent
expires.75

68. Id. at 860-61.
69. Id. at 867.
70. Id. at 861. The first cited case, Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476 (1964), turned on whether replacement of portions of the patented item constituted
infringing "'reconstruction"' or permissible "'repair' of said item. Id. at 479. The second case,
Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1967), turned on the amount of reasonable
damages for direct infringement of the plaintiffs patented invention. Id. at 510.
71. Bolar, 733 F.2d at 861.
72. Id. at 863. The court stated that "[d]espite Bolar's argument that its tests are 'true
scientific inquiries' to which a literal interpretation of the experimental use exception logically
should extend, we hold the experimental use exception to be truly narrow,and we will not expand
it under the present circumstances." Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 864. The court stated, "Because 'laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation,
and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject' we must presume Congress was
aware that the FDCA would affect the earning potentiality of a drug patent, and chose to permit it."
Id. (quoting THEODORE SEDGWICK, THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OFSTATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 106 (2d ed. 1874)).
75. Bolar,733 F.2d at 864.
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One can only speculate on the extent to which the court's decision in
Roche v. Bolar was influenced by the unique circumstances of the
pharmaceutical industry and a concern for allowing brand-name drug
manufacturers to recapture some of their lost patent terms.76 Whether or
not that was the court's concern, Congress moved quickly to respond to
the loss of the patent term due to FDA review." However, viewed in the
context outside the pharmaceutical industry, the Bolar case represented an
exercise in semantics that produced a result that was neither compelled by
prior case law nor consistent with other areas of patent law.78
On the question of whether the use of a patented invention standing
alone can constitute an act of infringement, neither the language of the
statute nor the prior case law required the court to answer yes in all
instances.79 Clearly, the use of a patented device for its intended purpose
is an act of infringement regardless of whether the infringer made the
device or sold the device. 80 Likewise, the use of a patented process for its
intended purpose is an act of infringement regardless of how the infringer
acquired the means to implement the process. 8 However, neither of these
clear cases of infringement by using patented subject matter requires the
conclusion that the use of patented subject matter for the purposes of
experimentation must also constitute an act of infringement.
The CAFC also mischaracterized Justice Story's conception of
experimental use as a "dilettante" activity. Justice Story viewed the
experimental use exemption as necessary to allow for scientific
experimentation and to test the accuracy of patent claims-hardly
dilettante activities." It was a later nineteenth-century case that defined the
experimental use exemption as experiments for the sole purpose of "mere
amusement" and idle "curiosity., 83 It is true that Justice Story contrasted
experimental use and for-profit use of a patented machine;' however, as
discussed earlier, it is not clear whether Justice Story intended this contrast
to disallow all experimental use by all for-profit organizations, or to

76. The court was also apparently concerned with "several bills that were then pending in
Congress to address the regulatory delay, and to public policy issues raised by... Bolar." Veronica
Lanier, Note, Medical Device Eligibilityfor the Statutory Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 705,711 (1995).
77. See infra Part II.B.
78. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
79. See Bolar, 733 F.2d at 863 (rejecting case law finding that experimental use does not
infringe as being dicta or unpersuasive).
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (West 2005) (stating "whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention ...infringes the patent").
81. See id.
82. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29. F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
83. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861).
84. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
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disallow only those uses that brought profit to the experimenter at the
expense of the patentee.85
Finally, as will be discussed in more detail later in the Article, the
court's dismissal of the argument regarding the de facto extension of the
patent term can only be understood in the context of the shortened patent
terms in the pharmaceutical industry.86 This disregard for the extension of
the patent monopoly is in marked contrast to many other patent law rules
which seek to limit the scope of patentee rights to those clearly set forth
in the Patent Act.87
The next major experimental use case, Embrex, Inc. v. Service
Engineering Corp., was decided in 2000.88 Embrex owned a patent on a
method for inoculating birds against disease by injecting vaccines into a
specified region of the egg before hatching.89 Service Engineering
attempted to design around the Embrex patent by building an injection
machine (not covered by the patent) and hiring two scientists to investigate
the possibility of injecting chicken embryos outside the region of the egg
covered by the patent. 9 The scientists used India ink to determine if
injections outside the region specified in the patent would remain there
and if vaccines injected outside the region specified in the patent would be
effective in inoculating birds. 91 The results of the tests were negative on
both counts; most injections outside the region covered by the patent
penetrated into the region that was covered by the patent, and the vaccine
injected outside the region covered by the patent produced little immunity
to disease.92
In the trial court, a jury found that Service Engineering had infringed
the Embrex patent and Embrex was awarded $500,000 in direct damages. 93
On appeal to the CAFC, the court affirmed the finding of infringement, but
remanded the case for further consideration on the question of damages.'
The CAFC found that injecting the eggs with vaccine was done expressly
for commercial purposes and therefore could not be immunized from

85. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text; see also Janice M. Mueller, No
"Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Inftingement for
BiomedicalResearch Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1,24 (2001) ("Thus, after Roche, scientists engaged
in research and development having more than negligible commercial purpose could no longer rely
on the experimental use doctrine to exempt their experiments from patent infringement liability.").
86. See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Part Ill.C.
88. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
89. Id. at 1346.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1346-47.
92. Id. at 1347.
93. Id. at 1349.
94. ld. at 1352.
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infringement under experimental use or de minimis use exemptions, even
though Service Engineering did not sell any injection machines or
commercially practice the patented method.95 On the question of damages,
the CAFC found that Embrex was entitled to a reasonable royalty, that
royalties are ordinarily computed on the basis of sales of a patented
product or process, but that parties can choose other methods to calculate
royalties such as "flat fees" or "milestone payments" in the case of
pre-commercialization licenses. 96 Because the record did not contain
sufficient evidence to compute a reasonable royalty, the court vacated the
damage award and remanded the case to the district court to determine the
proper basis for calculating a reasonable royalty. 97
Judge Rader wrote a concurring opinion in Embrex to express his view
that the experimental use and de minimis use exemptions to patent
infringement should be completely eliminated. 9 Noting that courts have
sometimes addressed these "excuses" as one, Judge Rader explained the
differences between the two and analyzed each separately. 99 According to
Judge Rader, experimental use is a plea based on the "character or intent"
of the infringing activity whereas de minimis use is a plea based on the
"amount or quantum of infringing activity."" In Judge Rader's opinion,
the Patent Act "leaves no leeway to excuse infringement because the
infringer only infringed a little," and the damages calculation in an
infringement action is fully sufficient to deal with the question of a de
minimis amount of infringing activity.'01 On the experimental use
exemption, Judge Rader cited two recent cases, one from the Supreme
Court and one from the CAFC, for the proposition that intent is irrelevant
to infringement. 112 Since Judge Rader had defined experimental use as a
plea based on the "intent" of the infringing activity, he concluded that

95. Id. at 1349. The court noted that "[Service Engineering's] chief commercial purpose was
to demonstrate to its potential customers the usefulness of the methods performed by its in ovo
injection machines. Just because [Service Engineering] was unsuccessful in selling its machines
does not confer infringement immunity upon SEC for its infringing acts." Id.
96. Id. at 1350.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1352 (Rader, J., concurring).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1353 (citing Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 624, 631 (1990) ("This
court questions whether any infringing use can be de minimis. Damages for an extremely small
infringing use may be de minimis, but infringement is not a question of degree.")).
102. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353 (Rader, J., concurring) ("'Application of the doctrine of
equivalents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires proof of
intent."') (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 34 (1997)). The
court also noted that "'[i]ntent is not an element of infringement."' Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353
(Rader, J., concurring) (quoting Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512,
1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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these recent cases had eliminated the experimental use exemption
completely, even in the instances of noncommercial and idle curiosity
uses. 103
In both Bolar and Embrex, the alleged infringers used patented subject
matter in an attempt to engineer around the patent claims and in both cases
the CAFC held the attempts to do so constituted acts of infringement."
This result creates a dichotomy in the use of patent information and leads
to a de facto expansion in the scope of the patent claims. 5 I will illustrate
this result with the facts of Bolar.
Bolar was, of course, free to spend an unlimited amount of time
reading, studying, and researching the information contained in the Roche
patent for any purpose whatsoever without infringing the patent rights.'°6
On the other hand, Bolar's physical use of the information, no matter how
minimal or non-injurious to the patentee, would constitute an act of
infringement.10 7 This "look but don't touch" rule regarding use of patent
information results in random variations in market competition. If the
information contained in the patent application is susceptible to purely
mental manipulation, it can be used to produce a non-infringing substitute
product and market competition will be increased. However, if the
information contained in the patent application can only be fully
comprehended through physical manipulation, it cannot be used to
produce a non-infringing substitute product and market competition will
be decreased. In the great majority of instances, this dichotomy works to
benefit patentees and disadvantage competitors because few inventions
can be fully understood without physical use. Thus, the prohibition of
physical use encourages drafters of patent applications to provide as little
information as possible without running afoul of the required enabling
disclosure.
The de facto expansion in the scope of patent claims follows directly
from the "look don't touch" rule on the use of patent information. It was
not possible for Bolar (or any other competitor) to develop a noninfringing substitute drug compound, or an improved drug compound,
without physical use of Roche's patented drug compound. 108 To the extent
Bolar was denied this opportunity, Roche's patent claims were, in effect,
103. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353 (Rader, J., concurring). Judge Rader thought that "[tihese
recent prouncements should dispose of the intent-based prong of SEC's [or anyone else's]
argument" against patent infringement. Id.
104. See Strandburg, supranote 11, at 103 ("As Embrex vividly illustrates, the attempt to build
on what has been established will almost unavoidably touch upon the previous results.").
105. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
106. See Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,862 (citing W. ROBINSON, THE
LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898 (1890)).
107. See id. at 863.
108. See Bolar, 733 F.2d at 863.
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expanded to cover substitute and improved drug compounds that Roche
did not, and perhaps could not, claim in its initial patent application. Stated
differently, the denial of Bolar' s opportunity to experiment with Roche' s
patented drug compound served to provide Roche with the same expanded
scope of patent protection that Roche would have obtained, but did not
obtain, through the issuance of multiple fencing patent applications."
Finally, before moving on to the next major experimental use case, a
brief critique of Judge Rader' s concurring opinion is in order. Judge Rader
was surely correct in distinguishing "de minimis" and "experimental use"
in his assertion that there is no provision in the Patent Act exempting
minor infringement, and that the damages assessment can be tailored to the
quantum of infringing activity and economic harm." ° However, his
analysis of experimental use is more problematic.1 ' Judge Rader was
correct in his assertion that it is not necessary to prove intent in order to
establish infringement; what is far less clear is whether intent was ever an
element of experimental use. 112 Although courts often discuss
experimental use in terms of its purpose (amusement, curiosity, noncommercial), no prior experimental use case has held that the intent of the
experimenter is dispositive of the question of infringement exemption."13
The case law in fact appears much to the contrary and strongly suggests
that the objective characterization of the experimental activity, not the
intent of the experimenter, is the factor that determines infringement." 4 If
intent has not been, and is not now, an element of the experimental use
exemption, then the fact that intent is not required to prove infringement
generally is irrelevant to the continued existence of the experimental use
exemption.
The most recent, and by far the most narrow, explication of the
109. See id.; see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 2-34 (2003), http://www.ftc.govlosl
2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
110. See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352-53 (Rader, J., concurring);
see also Michelle Walters, De Minimis Use and Experimental Use Exceptions to Patent
Infringement: A Comment on the Embrex Concurrence, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 509,515 (2001) ("The de
minimis use exception should be eliminated as a defense to patent infringement because the
exception is judicially redundant and rarely applied. There are other mechanisms... which are
equally capable of dealing with infringement cases of de mimimis proportions.").
I 11. See Mueller, supra note 85, at 29-30. Contrary to Judge Rader's concurrence, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinsondid not create new law nor change the law with respect to the
common law experimental use doctrine. The accused infringer in Warner-Jenkinsondid not rely
on the experimental use doctrine, nor did the case involve the use of research tools; both parties
were commercial manufacturers of purified dyes. Id.
112. Id. at30.
113. See id. ("'[I]ntent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents."'
(quoting Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997)).
114. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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experimental use exemption came in Madey v. Duke University.'15 Madey
was a tenured faculty member at Duke University, director of a physics
research laboratory and owner of a patent on a free-electron laser (FEL)
oscillator which was used as a spectroscopy research tool.116 Madey
resigned his position at Duke after a disagreement over the management
of the laboratory.1 17 Duke continued to use the FEL oscillator after
Madey's resignation. 1 8 Madey then sued Duke for infringement of the
FEL patent and Duke raised the defense that its use of the FEL oscillator
fell within the experimental use exemption to patent infringement. 1 9
The district court found for Duke on the issue of experimental use. E°
As defined by the district court, the experimental use defense covered uses
12 1
that were "'solely for research, academic, or experimental purposes."",
On appeal, the CAFC held that the district court's definition of
experimental use was too broad and ignored the holdings in Embrex and
Roche that the experimental use defense is strictly limited to activities
"performed 'for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry."",12 2 The CAFC stated that any use which has the
"'slightest commercial implication"' or is "in keeping with the legitimate
business of the alleged infringer" cannot qualify for the experimental use
2
defense.1
In applying this stricter standard to the facts of the case, the
court concluded that Duke's use of the FEL oscillator did not fall within
the experimental use exemption. 124 First, the court held that the proper
focus for experimental use analysis here should not be Duke's nonprofit
status, but rather Duke's "legitimate business objectives.
Second,the
court held that Duke's use of the FEL oscillator for research projects
"unmistakably further[ed]" Duke's "legitimate business objectives,
including educating . . . students and faculty participating in these
[research] projects," enhancing the status of the university, and luring

115. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
116. Id. at 1352.
117. Id. at 1352-53.
118. Id. at 1353.
119. Id.
120. Id.at 1355-56.
121. Id. at 1355 (quoting Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420,425 (M.D.N.C. 2001)).
122. Id. at 1361-62 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2000)). The court also stated that "use does not qualify for the experimental use defense when
it is undertaken in the 'guise of scientific inquiry' but has 'definite, cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes."' Id.at 1362 (quoting Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1349).
123. Id. (quoting Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353); see also Strandburg, supranote 11, at 99 (stating
a concern that the "'legitimate business"' test will prove broad enough to include "almost any
conceivable use" able to exploit a patentee's potential market (quoting Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362)).
124. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.
125. Id. at 1362.
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"lucrative research grants, students and faculty. 1 26
The sweeping holding in Madey v. Duke would appear to preclude
experimental use of patented subject matter by all nonprofit research
organizations, including federal laboratories, research foundations and
research hospitals.12 7 Indeed, "the legitimate business objective" test as
applied by the court in Madey is so open-ended that it could conceivably
be interpreted to preclude experimental use of patented subject matter even
by isolated individuals if the use was pursuant to any specific objective.
This interpretation of the "business objective" test would morph it into the
"idle curiosity" test; any experiment that had a specific purpose or goal
would fail both the "idle curiosity" and the "business objective" tests.
Madey is a classic example of a case that reached the right conclusion,
but for the wrong reasons. The court was forced into adopting such an
extremely limited experimental use exemption-an exemption that
obliterated distinctions between for-profit and nonprofit entities and
activities-by its prior precedent. 128 Since the court had already held that
129
economic loss was irrelevant to the determination of experimental use,
the court did not, and could not, consider the economic consequences to
Madey of Duke's use of the FEL oscillator. The intended purpose of the
FEL oscillator was as a research tool and this is precisely how Duke used
it.'30 As a result, Madey was deprived of the licensing revenue he was
entitled to receive for the use of his invention for its intended purpose. If
inventors of research tools are unable to realize a fair return on their
inventions, the incentive to invent research tools will be diminished, fewer
research tools will be invented, and the advances in science made possible
by new research tools will be retarded. 13' This result follows whether or

126. Id.; see also Strandburg, supra note 11, at 84 (noting that this result runs contrary to
widespread belief within the academic research community that "purely academic research is
categorically excused from patent infringement liability").
127. See Strandburg, supra note 11, at 85 ('Ihe court does not suggest where, outside of the
halls of academe, such scientific philosophers are to be found in this modem age, but surely their
ranks are thin indeed.").
128. See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361-62.
129. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Thus, the
patentee does not need to have any evidence of damage or lost sales to bring an infringement
action."). On this point, the court confused the relevance of economic harm to patent infringement
and the relevance of economic harm to the experimental use exemption to patent infringement. See
supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
130. See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1352.
131. See Mueller, supra note 85, at 39-40. Mueller argues that:
[r]esearchers are ordinary consumers of patented research tools, and if these
consumers were exempt from infringement liability, the patent holder would have
nowhere else to turn to collect patent royalties. An excessively broad research
exemption could eliminate incentives for private firms to develop and disseminate
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not the experimenter is a university or publicly traded company. The
CAFC was correct, therefore, that the focus of the analysis in the case
should not be on Duke's nonprofit status. However, the court was incorrect
in asserting that any use within Duke's educational mission or beyond
mere idle curiosity was outside of the permitted scope of experimental use.
The analysis in Madey should have instead focused solely on whether
there was a cognizable economic harm to Madey that resulted from Duke's
use of the FEL oscillator. 32 Duke used the patented FEL oscillator without
authorization 33 to obtain the exact research data that the FEL oscillator
was designed to yield and in so doing infringed Madey's exclusive patent
right to control the use of the FEL oscillator and to receive compensation
for allowing others to use it. 34 The situation would have been quite
different, however, if Duke had experimented with the patented FEL
oscillator for the purpose of developing improvements to the FEL
oscillator or of inventing a new, non-infringing oscillator. The only
economic harm that Madey would suffer as a result of this latter type of
use would be the loss of revenue due to the de facto extension of his patent
term and the de facto expansion of his patent claims. If researchers had to
await the expiration of Madey's patent before experimenting with the FEL
oscillator to develop a substitute oscillator device, then Madey's patent
term would be extended by the time it takes to perform the post-patent
experimentation. 135 Likewise, if researchers cannot experiment with the
FEL oscillator to develop an improved oscillator or a non-infringing
substitute oscillator, then the scope of Madey's patent claims will be
expanded to cover a host of competing oscillator devices136
In some cases, there is a fine line between the use of patented subject
matter for its intended purpose, and the use of patented subject matter to
develop improvements and non-infringing substitutes to the patented
subject matter. For example, in the case of the FEL oscillator, a researcher
experimenting with the FEL oscillator in order to develop a new, more
accurate oscillator would first have to determine the accuracy of the FEL

new research tools, which could on balance do more harm than good to the
research enterprise.
Id.
132. See Strandburg, supra note 11, at 96 (suggesting that the expansion of the "'commercial
use"' concept to "'legitimate business"' purpose addresses the difficulty arising from not-for-profit
experimentations which can cause monetary losses to the patent holder (quoting Madey, 307 F.3d
at 1362)).
133. See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1353.
134. See id.
135. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
136. See id.
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oscillator by using it for its intended purposes in different types of tests.
Part IV of this Article will discuss this problem further and suggest a
straight forward means by which a line can be drawn between proper and
improper uses of all types of patent subject matter.
B. The Statutory Experimental Use Exemption
1. The Hatch-Waxman Act
Congress responded to Roche v. Bolarby adopting the Hatch-Waxman
Act, 137 an ingenious, yet convoluted, reversal of the Bolar decision. In the
Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress amended § 271(e)(1) of the Patent Act to
provide that "[iut shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell ...a patented invention... solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under a federal law
which regulates the manufucture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products. ' ' 138 This amendment clearly allowed generic drug
companies to experiment with patented brand-name drugs in order to
establish the bioequivalency of generic drug substitutes and thereby obtain
FDA approval of the generic drugs prior to the expiration of the brandname patents. 139 The immediate effect of this amendment was to eliminate
the de facto patent term extension that Bolar had implicitly condoned."4
However, Congress simultaneously authorized the extension of the
original patent term up to a maximum of five years 41 in order to
compensate brand-name manufacturers for the time lost due to the FDA
approval process, as well as the loss of the de facto patent term
extension. 142
Congress, though, was not content with the simple quid pro quo of
exempting generic manufacturers from infringement for experimenting
with patented brand-name drugs and granting brand-name manufacturers
an extension to their drug patent terms. Through further amendments to
the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Patent Act, Congress
created an elaborate handicapping system for the pharmaceutical industry.
In addition to the infringement exemption, generic drug manufacturers
were allowed to use the results of a brand-name drug's clinical trials to

137. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat 1585 (1984).
138. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000); see also Hatch-Waxman Act § 202.
139. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
140. See id.
141. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6).
142. See id.
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establish the safety and efficacy of generic drugs143 and were given an
incentive to challenge patents on brand-name drugs: The first generic
manufacturer that successfully challenges a brand-name drug patent by
establishing that the patent was either invalid or would not be infringed by
the sale of the generic drug is given a 180-day period of market
exclusivity.

4

Brand-name manufacturers were also given new rights. The Patent Act
was amended to create an entirely new, and entirely artificial, act of
infringement: infringement by filing with the FDA. Although generic
manufacturers were allowed to experiment with patented drugs to obtain
data necessary to submit to the FDA, the actual submission of the data to
the FDA would constitute infringement.145 In addition, when brand-name
manufacturers filed infringement suits against generic manufacturers, the
brand-name manufacturers were granted automatic thirty-month stays on
FDA approval of the generic drug. "4However, brand-name manufacturers
could not recover monetary damages for the infringement unless there was
a "commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United
States." '47
The Hatch-Waxman Act amendments to the FDCA and Patent Act
spawned a complex set of cases on both procedural and substantive
issues.148 The procedural issues dealt with such questions as what brandname patents could be listed with the FDA, 49 whether third parties could
challenge the listing of brand-name patents,15° and whether brand-name
manufacturers could obtain multiple thirty-month stays on FDA approval
of the same generic drug.15 ' The substantive issues dealt with the subject
matter covered under the Hatch-Waxman experimental use exemption and
the permitted uses of this subject matter.
143. Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2005).
144. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
146. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
147. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(C).
148. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (2002), http://www.ftc.gov/05/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf
(analyzing the effectiveness of the Hatch-Waxman Act and discussing abuses of the 180-day
exclusivity and 30-month stay provisions).
149. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding
an FDA regulation requiring that patents submitted as part of an ANDA supplement be listed in the
Orange Book).
150. See, e.g., Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act did not create a private right of action and that only the U.S.
government may bring suit for a de-listing of the Orange Book under U.S.C. § 337(m)).
151. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 686, 691 (E.D.
Pa. 2004) (noting that prior case law allowing New Drug Application holders to obtain multiple
thirty-month stays was statutorily overruled by 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C)).
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2. Hatch-Waxman Cases
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 52 the Supreme Court considered
whether the § 271(e)(1) statutory infringement exemption covered the
testing of an implantable cardiac defibrillator in order to obtain data to
submit to the FDA for marketing approval. 53 The Court held that the
phrases "'patented invention"' and "'a Federal law"' used in § 271(e)(1)
encompassed all inventions that were subject to regulation by the FDA
under the FDCA, including medical devices.' 54
A district court case, also involving an implantable defibrillator,
considered whether the § 271(e)(1) exemption applied to the situation
where the testing manufacturer intends to commercialize the device
"before the expiration of the allegedly infringed patents."' 55 The plaintiff
argued that Congress's intent in enacting § 271 (e)(1) was to prevent patent
holders from obtaining de facto extensions of their patent monopolies.
Therefore, the plaintiff urged, the only type of permissible testing was for
the purpose of entering the market after the patent at issue had expired.156
The court found this view of § 271(e)(1) too narrow and held that
Congress's primary concern in enacting § 271 (e)(1) was "to create a legal
environment that would enable new, medically beneficial, costcompetitive products to reach the general
marketplace" as soon as possible
1 57
without infringing unexpired patents.
In yet another case involving an implantable defibrillator, the CAFC
considered whether displaying the defibrillator at medical conferences to
physicians and non-physicians, and also presenting the results of the
clinical tests to physicians, investors, analysts, and journalists, were
activities so unrelated to obtaining data for submission to the FDA that
they would cause a loss of the § 27 1(e)(1) exemption.1 58 The court found
that all of these activities involved the dissemination of data that was
developed to obtain FDA approval
and that nothing in the statute
159
prohibited disseminating such data.
152. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
153. Id. at 665.
154. Id. at 666-69 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) (2000)) (holding that construction of the
1984 Act as a whole confirmed the lower court's finding that the Act meant to include medical
devices as well).
155. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
156. Id.
157. Id. The court further explained that "[iut would be inconsistent with the positive goal of
maximizing post-patent availability of lower priced new products to artificially limit the exemption
only to those parties who would (or could) not enter the marketplace until after the patents expired."
Id. at 1274.
158. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1521-22 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
159. Id. at 1525 ("If Congress intended to make [marketplace competition] more difficult, if
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3. The Federal Circuit Decision in Integra
Lifesciences v. Merck
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA' 6° involved a series of
patents on a peptide sequence referred to as the RGD peptides or simply
RGD.' 6 ' RGD promotes cell adhesion by stimulating the growth of new
blood vessels and it was thought that it could aid in wound healing. 62
Integra, the owner of the patents, obtained the patents from a company that
was unable to develop a viable commercial product. 63 In an unrelated
research effort, a scientist, Dr. Cheresh, working at Scripps Research
Institute (Scripps), discovered that blocking certain receptors on
endothelial cells would inhibit the growth of new blood vessels and that
this mechanism could be used "as a means to halt tumor growth by
starving rapidly dividing tumor cells [of their blood supply]."64 Beginning
in 1988, Merck funded this research and after Dr. Cheresh was successful65
in reversing tumor growth in chicken embryos using an RGD peptide,'
Merck entered into a second funding agreement with Scripps and Dr.
Cheresh to perform in vitro and in vivo testing of RGD peptides to develop
the information necessary for FDA approval of clinical trials."6 Upon
learning of this research project using the RGD peptides, Integra filed an
infringement suit. 67 Merck responded, claiming that the research fell
within the §271 (e)(1) research exemption. 168 The district court determined
that the research was not covered by the § 271(e)(1) research exemption
jury awarded Integra $15,000,000 in reasonable royalty
and the 69
damages.

1

On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the infringement holding, but remanded
the case for further consideration of the damages award. 70 The court found
that "the Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not clinical testing to

not impossible, by preventing competitors from using, in an admittedly non-infringing manner, the
derived test data for fund raising and other business purposes, it would have made that intent clear.
The statute contains no such provision.").
160. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed Cir. 2003).
161. Id. at 862.
162. Id. at 862-63.
163. Id. at 873 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also George Fox, Note,
Integra v. Merck: Limiting the Scope of the § 271(e)(1) Exception to Patent Infringement, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 201 (2004).

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Integra, 331 F.3d at 863.
Id. at 873 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 863 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 863, 869.
Id. at 872.
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supply information to the FDA, but only general biomedical research to
identify new pharmaceutical compounds" and that the results of this
research may or may not be submitted to the FDA, depending upon the
success of the experiments.171 Although the CAFC did not specifically find
that the RGD peptides were a research tool, it expressed a special concern
that extending the § 271(e)(1) exemption to embrace new drug
development activities such as these would "vitiate" the rights of patentees
owning biotechnology research tools. 17 2 According to the court, the HatchWaxman Act was simply intended to reverse the holding in Roche1 73and
"not to deprive entire categories of inventions of patent protection."
The majority opinion did not discuss the common law experimental use
exemption at all, but did mention it in a footnote referring to Judge
Newman's dissent.174 The court stated:
In her dissent, Judge Newman takes this opportunity to
restate her dissatisfaction with this court's decision in Madey
v. Duke Univ ..... However, the common law experimental
use exception is not before the court in the instant case. The
issue before the jury was whether the infringing pre-clinical
experiments are immunized from liability via the "FDA
exemption... "175
Although the court was correct that the issue before the jury was framed
in terms of the § 271(e)(1) research exemption, the common law
experimental use exemption was an integral part of the trial court
proceedings. Merck's initial response to the patent infringement suit
claimed that the activities were exempted by both the common law
research exemption and the § 271(e)(1) research exemption. 176 At the
conclusion of trial, the district court held that all but one of the pre-1995
alleged infringing activities involving the RGD peptides were protected by
the common law experimental use exemption. 177 Following post-trial
motions, the district court dismissed Integra's suit against Dr. Cheresh and
Scripps based on the common law experimental use exemption. 178 The
CAFC's failure to even mention the common law experimental use

171. Id. at 866. The court noted that Merck's experiments could plainly not fall under the
§ 271(e)(1) exception because "[t]he FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs that may or may not
later undergo clinical testing for FDA approval." Id.
172. Id. at 867.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 863 n.2.
175. Id.
176. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2372, 2379 (2005).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2380.
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exemption in its discussion of the district court proceedings is indicative
of the CAFC majority's position 79that a common law experimental use
exemption is nearly non-existent.1
Judge Newman wrote a highly critical dissent, noting that the majority
decision had held that neither the common law research exemption nor the
§ 27 1(e)(1) research exemption immunized the activities at issue. 18 Judge
Newman was especially concerned with the common law research
exemption, asserting that the majority holding in effect eliminated the
common law research exemption altogether, that such a holding is
inconsistent with well established patent law and policy, and that the
elimination of the common law research exemption will serve to retard the
advancement of competition, technology, and scientific knowledge.181 In
Judge Newman's view, a fundamental purpose of the patent system is to
provide scientific and technological information, and, if the practical use
of this information is prohibited until the expiration of a patent seventeen
to twenty years later (the information is "placed on ice"), then the
information disclosed in a patent would have little value. 182 It does not
matter in Judge Newman's analysis whether the information is used for
research to better understand the patent subject matter, to improve upon
the patent subject matter, to find a new use for the patent subject matter,
or to modify or engineer around the patent subject matter. 183 Judge
Newman explained that if such types of research were "subject to
prohibition by the patentee the advancement of technology would stop, for
the first patentee in the field could bar not only patent-protected
competition, but all research that might lead to such competition, as well
as barring improvement or challenge or avoidance of patented
'
technology."184
Judge Newman also addressed the majority's suggestion that the RGD
peptides were a research tool and that if the defendant were allowed to use
the RGD peptides for the general purpose of drug discovery this would
vitiate the rights of patentees owning research tools. 181Judge Newman saw
a fundamental distinction between research into the science and
technology disclosed in patents, and the use of patented products or
methods as research tools. 186 A research tool, Judge Newman explained,

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See supra Part II.A.2.
Integra, 331 F.3d at 873 (Newman, ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 873-76.
Id. at 875-76.
Id. at 875.

184. Id.

185. Id. at 877-78.
186. Id.
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is a product or method whose purpose is use in the conduct of
research, whether the tool is an analytical balance, an assay
kit, a laser device.., or a biochemical method such as the
PCR .... Use of [such a] tool in one's research is quite
different from study of the tool itself.'87
Turning to the RGD peptides, Judge Newman concluded that they were
not a research tool "but simply new compositions having certain biological
properties. ' 88
4. The Supreme Court Decision in Merck v. Integra Lifesciences
On review, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the CAFC and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with the Court's decision.1 89 The Court defined the issue presented by the
case as "whether uses of patented inventions in preclinical research, the
results of which are not ultimately included in a submission to the Food
and Drug Administration
. . . .are exempted from infringement by
' 19
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(l).
The Court began its analysis by noting that under the FDCA, there are
two submissions that a drugmaker must make to the FDA.1 91 First, the
drugmaker must obtain FDA approval to conduct clinical trials on human
subjects; this approval is requested by the submission of an Investigational
New Drug Application (IND) 92 Second, the drugmaker must obtain FDA
authorization to market a new drug; this authorization is obtained through
the submission of a New Drug Application (NDA).1 93 The Court rejected
Integra's argument that preclinical studies are not reasonably related to an
IND and therefore are outside the scope of § 271(e)(1), noting that the
FDA requires an IND to include "summaries of the pharmacological,
toxicological,
pharmacokinetic, and biological qualities of the drug in
1 94
animals."'
The Court also rejected the CAFC's conclusion that the Scripps-Merck
experiments fell outside the § 271(e)(1) exemption because they were

187. Id. at 878.
188. Id.
189. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2384 (2005).
190. Id. at 2376.
191. Id. at2377.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2381. The Court also noted that the FDA approval of an IND involves an
assessment of the risks and benefits associated with a proposed clinical trial and that this
assessment requires that the IND include sufficient information regarding the potential risks and
benefits of the drug under investigation. Id.
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directed toward identifying drug candidates for future clinical trials rather
than supplying information directly for submission to the FDA. 95 Under
the Court's interpretation of § 271 (e)(1), the use of patented subject matter
in (i) experimenting "on drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an
FDA submission," and in (ii) obtaining research data that is not ultimately
submitted to the FDA can both be exempted from infringement.19 6 The
Court found that the § 271(e)(1) exemption for experimenting on drugs
that are not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission was compelled
by the realities of scientific research in which no one can know whether
an initially promising drug candidate will prove successful until the
conclusion of preclinical and clinical testing. 197 Thus, the Court found that
the CAFC's interpretation of § 271(e)(1), which would fail to exempt
research use of patented drugs unless an IND is ultimately submitted to the
FDA, was tantamount to exempting only activities necessary to obtain
approval of generic drugs because only in the case of generic drugs can
one know at the outset of the testing that the active ingredient in the drug
being tested will be the subject of a submission to the FDA. 198 Under the
Court's interpretation:
Properly construed, § 271(e)(1) leaves adequate space for
experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory
approval: At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable basis
for believing that a patented compound may work, through a
particular biological process, to produce a particular
physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that,
if successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission
to the FDA, that use is "reasonably related" to the
"development and submission of information
under... Federal law."' 99
The Court similarly found that the § 271(e)(1) exemption for the use
of patent subject matter to obtain research data that is not ultimately
submitted to the FDA was compelled by the uncertainty at the time of the
research of knowing what kinds of research data-and what amounts of
research data-are necessary to include in an IND or a NDA to obtain
FDA approval.2" The § 271 (e)(1) exemption would apply, the Court held,

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 2382-83.
Id. at 2382.
Id. at 2382-83.
Id. at 2383.
Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
Id.; 125 S. Ct. at 2382-83. The Court stated:
This is especially true at the preclinical stage of drug approval. FDA regulations
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"as long as there is a reasonable basis for believing that the experiments
will produce
'the types of information that are relevant to an IND or
' ''2 0 1

NDA .

1

The Court noted that the CAFC suggested that a narrow construction
of the § 27 1(e)(1) exemption was necessary in order to avoid depriving
research tool patentees of the entire value of their patents.2 °2 The Court
stated that Integra had never argued that the RGD peptides at issue were
research tools and, citing to Judge Newman's dissenting opinion, that it is
apparent from the record they were not.20 3 On the question of research
tools, the Court concluded: "We therefore need not-and do not--express
a view about whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from
infringement the use of 'research tools' in the development of information
for the regulatory process.
Finally, unlike the CAFC, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged
the role of the common law experimental use exemption in describing the
lower court proceedings.2 °5 The Court noted that Merck claimed its
activities were exempt from infringement under the common law research
exemption and that the district court found some of the alleged infringing
activities were, in fact, exempt under the common law research
exemption.2 °6

II.

THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF

OTHER PATENT POLICIES

As discussed above, the CAFC majority's current formulations of the
common law and Hatch-Waxman experimental use exemptions serve both
to limit scientific and technical advance, and to retard competition. These
results are directly contrary to other U.S. and foreign patent law policies
that have long sought to promote science, technology and competition.2 7
Focusing now only on the discrepancies between other areas of patent law

provide only that "[tihe amount of information on a particular drug that must be
submitted in an IND... depends upon such factors as the novelty of the drug, the
extent to which it has been studied previously, the known or suspected risks, and
the development phase of the drug."
Id. at 2383 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(b) (2005)).
201. Id. at 2383-84 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
at 23, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237)).
202. Id. at 2382 n.7.
203. Id. (citing Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cir.
2003)) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2379.
206. Id.
207. See infra Parts HI.A, C.
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and the CAFC's majority's formulation of the common law experimental
use exemption, I will first briefly review U.S. laws that have evolved to
promote innovation and competition-namely laws that are intended to
enable the practice of a patented invention and laws that are intended to
limit the expansion of a patent's scope. I will then discuss foreign laws and
international agreements that expressly allow for the experimental use of
patented subject matter to promote science, technology, and competition.
I recognize that each of these policies is subject to interpretation and
debate, and do not suggest that the experimental use exemption must
conform to any of these policies. The purpose instead is simply to show
the marked inconsistency between the current formulation of the
experimental use exemption and the general thrust of patent policy in other
areas of U.S. and international law.
A. The U.S. PatentAct Section 112 Enabling DisclosurePolicy
Judge Newman's dissenting opinion in Integra discussed in general
terms the contradiction between the patent system's goal of providing
scientific and technological information, and the CAFC majority's
interpretation of the experimental use exemption in a way that prohibits
physical use of the information provided in the patent.2 °8 The contradiction
that Judge Newman noted becomes even sharper when one considers the
specific statutory language and case law that has been adopted to promote
the provision of scientific and technological information in patents.
Section 112 of the Patent Act provides: "The [patent] specification
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains... to make
and use the same . ..."' On its face, the verbs "making" and "using" in

§ 112 suggest that the information disclosed in the patent specification
can, and should, be physically used. There are only two ways to interpret
the verbs "making" and "using" in § 112 in a manner that would not allow
unlicensed physical use of the information contained in the written
description. Both are illogical.
One interpretation would be that the references to "making" and
"using" in §112 refer only to cognitive knowledge. 2 0 That is to say, the
test of an adequate written description would be a question of whether the
information in the written description is sufficient to provide a person

208. Integra, 331 F.3d at 873-75 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
209. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
210. See Mark J. Stewart, Note, The Written DescriptionRequirement of35 U.S.C. § 112(1):
The StandardAfter Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV. 537,
542 (1999).
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"skilled in the art" with the knowledge necessary to understand how to
make and use the invention. 2" There are two difficulties with this
interpretation. In many cases, it is not possible to understand how to make
and use an invention without physical use of the invention. In such cases,
the written description would always fail as an enabling disclosure because
the language alone would not provide the knowledge necessary to make
and use the invention. The second difficulty is that the determination of
whether a written description provides the requisite knowledge to make
and use the invention would always be a hypothetical exercise involving
a subjective inquiry when an objective inquiry is possible and
preferable.212
The second interpretation of the references to "making" and "using" in
§ 112 would be that they contemplate physical making and using of the
invention but only after the expiration of the patent term. There are also
two difficulties with this interpretation. First, as Judge Newman has
observed, if the information contained in the written description cannot be
physically used until the expiration of the patent term seventeen to twenty
years in the future, and physical use of the information is necessary to
understand the written description, then the information disclosed would
have little value. 213 Given the pace of innovation in many technical fields,
information disclosed under these circumstances would not only be placed
on ice, it would be frozen into extinction. A second difficulty lies in the
contradiction between requiring the patentee to disclose the invention at
the beginning of the patent term while denying the public an opportunity
to use the patented invention until the end of the patent term. 21' The

211. See id.
212. See id. at 545-46 (discussing the difficulties of implementing the writing requirement,
based on knowledge of the art, in the technologically complex biotechnical field); see also A
PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, & Mark B.
Myers eds., 2004) availableat http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089107/htmlI81.html (arguing for
the modification or removal of the subjective elements of litigation as one of "the factors that
increase the cost and decrease the predictability of patent infringement litigation are issues... that
depend on the assessment of a party's state of mind at the time of... patent application."); Kevin
Sandstrom, Note, How Much Do We Value Research and Development?: Broadening the
Experimental Use Exemption to PatentInfringement in Light oflntegra Lifesciences, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA, 30 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 1059, 1090-91 (2004) (noting the conflict between the
enablement requirement and the desire of a patentee to exclude others, and arguing that Integra
should be overturned to allow use of a patented drug to create different derivative products).
213. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875-76 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
214. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1022. Eisenberg argues that if the public had absolutely
no right to make, use, or sell the patented invention until the end of the patent term, it would be
somewhat puzzling to require that the patentee give the public an enabling disclosure of the
invention at the beginning of the patent term. The requirement, Eisenberg contends, of early
disclosure suggests that certain uses of patented inventions during the patent term do not constitute
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requirement of an invention disclosure at the beginning of the patent term
suggests that some physical use of the patented invention during the patent
term is allowed; otherwise, an invention disclosure at the end of the patent
term would suffice.2 15
On the other hand, clearly § 112 cannot be read in a way that would
allow unauthorized commercial exploitation of a patented invention and
thereby strip the patentee of the rights granted in § 271. The only logical
way to interpret the verbs "making" and "using" in § 112 is to allow
physical experimentation with a patented invention. This interpretation of
§ 112 would seem to be supported by the CAFC decisions on the question
of enabling disclosures. The court has explicitly stated many times that
enabling disclosure is fundamental to the U.S. patent system's quid pro
quo whereby an inventor is granted a patent monopoly in exchange for
providing information to enrich the store of public knowledge. 216 Again,
as Judge Newman correctly noted, in the great majority of cases if the
information disclosed in the patent specification cannot be physically used,
it cannot advance scientific knowledge.2" 7
Moreover, the CAFC has defined an enabling disclosure as information
sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand the
invention without the need to perform "undue experimentation., 218 Among
the factors listed by the court to be considered in determining whether a
disclosure would require undue experimentation are the quantity of
experimentation necessary, the amount of guidance available to perform
the experimentation, the presence or absence of working models, and the
predictability or unpredictability of research outcomes. 2 9 Again, it is very
difficult to reconcile the CAFC cases on § 112's undue experimentation
language with its cases on the experimental use exemption to patent
infringement. To do so would require a bizarre chain of reasoning: the
information disclosed in the patent specification is sufficient to teach the
invention if it does not have to be supplemented by undue additional
experimentation, but no experimentation (undue or otherwise) can be
performed because it would violate the rights of the patent holder.
B. U.S. Limits on Expanding a Patent's Scope
I discussed earlier how the CAFC's experimental use test results in a

patent infringement. Id.
215. See id.
216. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
217. Integra, 331 F.3d at 875-76 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
218. See Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk Als, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
219. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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de facto extension of the patent term and a de facto expansion of the patent
claims.22 The patent term will be extended by the time required to
experiment with an invention after the expiration of the patent term in
order to market a competing invention. The patent claims will be expanded
by the patentee's ability to prohibit experimentation with an invention and
thereby thwart the marketing of new or improved inventions that were not
claimed in the patent application. Both of these results conflict with well
established policies in other areas of patent law.
The U.S. Supreme Court held more than forty years ago that an attempt
to collect license royalties beyond the period of the patent term was
"unlawful per se" and constituted patent misuse rendering the license
unenforceable.22 The Court was clearly concerned by the prospect of
extending the patent monopoly beyond the time period specified in the
Patent Act.222 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated:
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he
can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use
that leverage to project those royalty payments beyond the
life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the
monopoly of the patent by tieing [sic] the sale or use of the
223
patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.
Although this decision has been criticized on various grounds by
commentators,224 it has never been overturned, has been acknowledged as
precedent by the CAFC, 225 and recently has been extended to the case of
foreign license agreements.226 Recall in Bolar that the CAFC dismissed
objections to the de facto extension of the patent term because this
extension served to offset to some extent the loss of the effective patent
term due to FDA review.227 Whether or not this rationale was supportable
in the context of the pharmaceutical industry at the time Bolar was
decided, it could never be supported outside of the pharmaceutical

220. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
221. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
222. See id.
223. Id. at 33.
224. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the
Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 707-12 (1986) (addressing the "Brulotte Problem");
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OFINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

LAW 380 (Harvard University Press 2003).
225. See, e.g., Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860,869 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (relying
on Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33).
226. See, e.g., Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund v. Debio Holding, S.A., 177 F. Supp. 2d 545,551
(E.D. La. 2001) (recognizing that no court had ever refused to apply the Brulotteholding to foreign
patent license agreements).
227. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864-67 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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industry and could not be supported within the pharmaceutical industry
after the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act.228
Justice Douglas analogized the enlargement of the patent monopoly by
extending the term of the patent through post-expiration royalties to the
enlargement of the patent monopoly by expanding the scope of the patent
claims by tying sales of a patented article to the purchase of an unpatented
article.229 Earlier Supreme Court cases had held that these tying
arrangements constituted patent misuse which rendered the patent
unenforceable until the patent misuse was purged.23 Over the years,
however, the doctrine of patent misuse has been narrowed by judicial
decisions and congressional legislation to the point that today patent
misuse has been largely subsumed into the field of antitrust law.231
Nonetheless, concern over arrangements in which a patent is used in a way
that limits competition continues.
The most recent and most comprehensive discussion of this subject is
the "Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property"
(Guidelines), jointly promulgated by the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission in 1995.232 There are three areas of antitrust
concern discussed in the Guidelines that are directly relevant to analysis
of the experimental use exemption: limiting competition in research and
development;23 3 limiting a licensee in dealing with technologies owned by
its licensor's competitors;2 34 and requiring a licensee to "grantback" to its
235
licensor improvements made by the licensee to the licensed technology.
The Guidelines provide that in analyzing the anticompetitive impact of
licensing arrangements, the DOJ and FTC (Agencies) will consider

228. See Eyal H. Barash, Experimental Uses, Patents,and Scientific Progress,91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 667,690 (1997) (noting that the statute overruled part of Bolarby legalizing experimentation
prior to patent expiration); Lanier, supra note 76, at 710-14; Mueller, supra note 85, at 25-27
(discussing the common law exemption's state following Congress's enactment of the act); Parker,
supra note 39, at 637-41 (discussing court interpretations of the act); Walters, supra note 110, at
523-32 (discussing court applications of the exception).
229. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
230. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661,665-66 (1944) (noting
that such arrangements divert the patent from its statutory purpose); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,491 (1942) (noting that a"patent affords no immunity for a monopoly
not within the grant").
231. See generally35 U.S.C.A. § 27 1(d) (2000) (immunizing certain conduct from the charge
of patent misuse); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,200 (1980) (discussing
how tying should be treated following the enactment of § 271 (d)).
232. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST
GUDEIJNESFoRTHELICENSINGOFINIEUIEcrUALPRoPERTY (1995), availableat http:llwww.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
233. Id. § 3.2.3.
234. Id. § 5.4.
235. Id. § 5.6.
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innovation markets, generally defined as research and development
activities directed toward development of new or improved goods or
processes, as separate markets distinct from the actual goods or processes
markets. 36 The concern here is that firms might enter into agreements that
retard the pace of research and development of new technology and
thereby constrain competition in the market for the current technology.237
The Guidelines define "exclusive dealing" as license arrangements that
prevent "licensee[s] from licensing, selling, distributing, or using
competing technolog[y]." 238 In analyzing the anticompetitive impact of
exclusive dealing arrangements, the Guidelines provide that the Agencies
will consider the extent to which the arrangements promote development
or constrain
of the licensor's technology and foreclose 2 3development,
9
competition, among competing technologies.
Finally, the Guidelines define "[g]rantbacks" as arrangements under
which licensees agree to grant to licensors the rights to improvements
made by the licensees to the licensed technologies.2' The principal
concern here is exclusive grantbacks to licensors. Exclusive grantbacks to
licensors "[limit] the licensee's incentives to engage in research and
development" because any new or improved technology yielded by the
research and development can only be commercialized through the
licensor.2 ' The licensee's disincentive results in lessened competition in
the research and development market and in the market for the goods or
processes being licensed.242
The current experimental use exemption promotes the anticompetitive
practices which the Guidelines seek to restrain.243 The inconsistency
between the current experimental use exemption and the antitrust licensing
guidelines can best be illustrated by considering private arrangements
among firms that would produce the same effect as the experimental use
exemption. 2 " For example, assume that all the firms in a market entered
236. Id. § 3.2.3.
237. Id.
238. Id. § 5.4.
239. Id.
240. Id. § 5.6.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. See Strandburg, supra note 11, at 82 (arguing that experimental use can circumvent
anticompetitive refusals to license because it provides an exemption to infringement liability in
principle). However, the current experimental use paradigm supports anticompetitive behaviors by
nullifying the experimental use exemption when in pursuit of "legitimate business" objectives. See
supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
244. See Mueller, supra note 85, at 15-16, 61-66 (suggesting researchers will more likely
either neglect or forego research or conduct such research without authorization when acquisition
of a research tool requires "direct license negotiations," and discussing the benefits of reachthrough royalties); Strandburg, supra note 11, at 102, 125-27 (pointing to the lack of incentive for
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into an agreement in which they agreed not to pursue research and
development of any technology that was under investigation by another
firm. Clearly, such an agreement would retard competition in the research
and development market and likely run afoul of the antitrust guidelines.
However, this is exactly the result that is produced by the current
experimental use exemption without the need of a private agreement.245
The firms in a market cannot pursue research in competition with one
another without first obtaining permission if the research necessitates the
use of patented technology.
The situation is the same in the case of exclusive dealing. Assume a
licensor prohibited a licensee from engaging in research with the licensed
technology in order to develop a non-infringing competing technology.
Such a prohibition would be similar to prohibiting the licensee from
dealing with technologies owned by the licensor's competitors and would
clearly limit competition both in the research and development market and
in the market for the technology being licensed. Again, however, the
current experimental use exemption produces this same result without the
need of a private agreement. 24 If the research required to develop a noninfringing competing technology necessitates the use of patented
technology, the patentee can prohibit this research by merely failing to
grant a license. If the patentee refuses to grant a license to perform the
research necessary to develop a non-infringing competing technology,
which is highly likely, competition is retarded in the research and
development market and the patentee's current technology is subject to
lessened competition.247

patent holders to license their competitors to produce follow-on innovations and the lack of
alignment between the patentee's and society's incentives to enter into the patent bargain); Jordan
P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as PatentInfringement: The Improprietyof a BroadException,
100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2184-85 (1991) (detailing the use of cross-licensing agreements to guarantee
access to competitors' innovations). But see Walters, supranote 110, at 529-33 (suggesting that an
experimental use exemption may not be necessary to corporations, given the implied right to
experiment in a sale of a product, the necessity of an express license to sell an improvement to a
patented product, and patent disclosure).
245. See Strandburg, supranote 11, at 93 (noting that by making infringement dependent upon
the legitimate business objectives of an unauthorized experimenter rather than commercial intent,
the court has precluded the ability of third-party inventors to develop improvements to patents via
follow-on innovation).
246. See id. at 102 ("Even though design-arounds and improvements are intended public
benefits of the patent system, patentees have little incentive to license their competitors to
experiment 'on' their inventions to produce such follow-on innovations.").
247. See id.
As cases like Embrex illustrate, patentees are not primarily concerned with
collecting royalties for such [experimental] uses but with impeding their
competitors' ability to use the patentees' inventive ideas as a basis for new
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Finally, the current experimental use exemption increases the
possibility of anticompetitive exclusive grantbacks by giving owners of
patented technology the exclusive right to control research utilizing that
technology.2 48 Again, if the research required to develop new and
improved technology necessitates the use of a patented technology which
must be licensed, the owner of the patented technology has the bargaining
of the new or improved technology as a
leverage to demand a grantback
249
condition of the license grant.
C. ForeignExperimental Use Exemptions
A number of countries have enacted a statutory experimental use
exemption. These countries include the United Kingdom,250 Japan, t
Germany, 252 China, 253 and Mexico. 254 An experimental use exemption has
inventions. Decisions such as Embrex, while indisputably correct as to the
commercial intentions of the unauthorized user, are certain to have a chilling
effect on this socially beneficial experimentation.
Id. (citations omitted).
248. See id. at 123-24 (discussing how tool patentees can "control the progress of research").
249. See id. at 123 (suggesting that in the case of research tools the primary financial return
to the research tool owners might come from exclusive control of the research results yielded by
the tool rather than from the widespread use of the tool itself).
250. Patents Act, 1977, ch. 37, § 60(5)(a) (Eng.) (stating that patent protection shall not apply
to an act "done privately and for purposes which are not commercial").
251. Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 61 ("'The effect of a patent right shall not extend to the
working of the patented invention for experiment or study."') (quoting Patent Act, 1978, art. 69,
§ 1 (Jap.), reprintedin 6 EHS Law Bulletin Series (Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., ed., 1978).
252. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDEBOOK: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 2-139
(Bern & Ruster eds., 1991). The exemption covers "[aicts carried out privately and for noncommercial purposes" and "[a]cts carried out for experimental purposes relating to the subject
matter of the patented invention." Parker, supra note 39, at 653 n.204 (citing WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDEBOOK: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 2-139 (Bern & Ruster
eds., 1991)).
253. Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 63 (citing Patent Law, adopted at the Fourth Session of the
Standing Committee of the 6th National Peoples Congress on March 12, 1984, translatedby the
Chinese Patent Office, Section 62(5)). The law reads: "'[Wlhere any person uses the patent
concerned solely for the purposes of scientific research and experimentation,' that use will not be
deemed to infringe." Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 62 (quoting Patent Law, Chinese Patent Office,
§ 62(5)).
254. Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 63 (citing Ley de Fomento y Protecci6n de la Propiedad
Industrial, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], § 22, 25 de Juin de 1991 (Mex.)). The pertinent
section of the law provides:
[T]he right conferred by a patent "shall not have any effect against... a third
party who, in the private or academic sphere and for noncommercial purposes,
engages in scientific or technological research activities for purely experimental,
testing or teaching purposes, and to that end manufactures or uses a product or a
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also been included in a number of international agreements including the
Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market (Community
Patent Convention), 255 the Proposed Patent Model for Developing
Countries,256 and the World Intellectual Property Organization Draft
Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property25as
7 far as Patents are Concerned (WIPO Draft Harmonization
Treaty).

Although the scope of these foreign experimental use exemptions
varies, they all provide at a minimum for the use of patent subject matter
for the purpose of determining whether a patented invention is feasible,
useful, or technically operable.258 Some of the foreign experimental use
exemptions are considerably broader and allow for the use of patent
subject matter even when the use is clearly commercially motivated.259
The language in the Community Patent Convention and WIPO Draft
Harmonization Treaty would appear to allow commercially motivated uses
of patent subject matter if the experimentation is directly related to the
patented invention. For example, the Community Patent Convention
provides that patent protection does not extend to "acts done privately and
for non-commercial purposes" or to "acts done for experimental purposes
relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention. ' '2' Likewise, the
WIPO Draft Harmonization Treaty provides that the patent owner has no
right to prevent third parties from performing acts:
process identical to the one patented .... "
Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 63 (quoting Ley De Fomento y Protecci6n de la Propiedad Industrial,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], § 22, 25 de Juin de 1991 (Mex.)).
255. Council Resolution 76/76, Community Patent Convention, art. 31, 1976 O.J. (L17) (EC),
reprintedin 15 I.L.M. 5 (1976) (articulating limitations on "[tihe rights conferred by a Community
Patent.").
256. WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions, Commentaries on the Model
Law.
257. WIPO Draft Harmonization Treaty, as reported in the "Basic Proposal" for the Treaty and
the Regulations, Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the Paris
Convention as Far as Patents are Concerned, The Hague, June 3 to 28, 1991, submitted, under Rule
29(1) of the Draft Rules of Procedure, by the Director General of WIPO. (ARTICLE 19, Alternative
B, Section 3(iii)).
258. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 38, at 654 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court
of Justice] Feb. 21, 1989, Case No. Y2R 53/87 (F.R.G.), translatedin 22 Int'l. Rev. Indus. Prop.
& Copyright 541,545 (1991)). See alsoJames Thuo Gathii, ConstruingIntellectualPropertyRights
and Competition Policy Consistently with FacilitatingAccess to Affordable AIDS Drugs to LowEnd Consumers,53 FLA. L. REV. 727,764-65 (2001) (discussing limitations regarding experimental
use of patented technologies contained in international agreements).
259. See Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., (1985) R.P.C. 515, 538 (C.A.) (holding that
"experimental purposes" may include a commercial purpose such as determining whether a quality
product can be manufactured according to the language of the patent specification); see also Smith
Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Evans Med. Ltd., (1989) 1 F.S.R. 513, 517 (Ch. (Pat. Ct.)) (holding
that experiments conducted to challenge the validity of a competitor's patent fell within the
experimental use exemption).
260. Community Patent Convention, supra note 255, at 13.
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(ii) where the act is done privately and on a non-commercial
scale or for a non-commercial purpose, provided that it does
not significantly prejudice the economic interests of the
owner of the patent;
(iii) where the act consists of making or using exclusively for
the purpose of experiments that relate to the subject matter of
the patented invention .... 261
These foreign experimental use exemptions disadvantage the United
States in two ways. First, these foreign experimental use exemptions allow
for the advancement of science and innovation to a much greater extent in
other countries than in the United States. In an era of global technology
competition, this could result in fewer jobs, larger trade deficits, and,
ultimately, a lower standard of living in the United States. If this occurs,
it would be an entirely self-inflicted harm that could be easily avoided
through either judicial or legislative reform of the U.S. experimental use
law. Second, these foreign experimental use exemptions provide scientists
and engineers in other countries with research opportunities that they do
not have in the United States. This could result in the migration of top
researchers from the United States to other countries and deprive industry,
as well as universities, of critical human resources. Again, if this were to
occur, it would be an entirely self-inflicted and avoidable harm.
The purpose of this section is not to suggest that the experimental use
exemption must be fully in accord with these other patent policies, and I
recognize that these other patent policies are themselves subject to
interpretation and debate. Nonetheless, I believe that when these other
patent policies are considered together they do reveal a marked conflict
between the current U.S. experimental use law and other U.S. and foreign
patent law policies.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL USE LAW REFORM PROPOSALS

A number of very thoughtful articles have been written over the years
on the experimental use exemption. These articles have proposed changes
in the law ranging from an extremely limited research exemption to an
exemption for any and all research purposes.262 In general, writers on the
subject have analyzed the experimental use exemption in terms of

261. WIPO Draft Harmonization Treaty, supra note 257. For a discussion of foreign
experimental use exemptions, see Parker, supra note 39, at 648-57 (finding that many of the
world's industrialized nations have exceptions for research related to the subject matter of a
patented invention); see also Bruzzone, supra note 9, at 61-66 (providing a "brief review of the
approaches some foreign states have taken").
262. See infra Part IV.A. 1-3.
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distinctions within four categories of facts: the type of organization
performing the experimentation, the purpose of the experimentation, the
intended purpose of the patented subject matter utilized in the
experimentation, and the source of funding for the experimentation.263
Analyses of the organizationperforming the experimentationhave focused
on distinctions between universities, small companies, and large
companies; analyses of the purpose of the experimentationhave focused
on distinctions between research to advance science or ascertain the
accuracy of patent specifications and research for the purpose of
developing new commercial products or processes; analyses of the
intendedpurpose of the patent subject matterused in the experimentation
have focused on distinctions between research tools and end-user
commercial products and processes; and analyses of the source offunding
for the experimentation have focused on distinctions between federal
funding, industry funding, and university or nonprofit funding."
In this part of the Article, the first section will describe the main law
reform proposals that have been suggested for the experimental use
exemption.265 Although each of these proposals has been advanced as an
independent recommendation, there is in fact considerable overlap
between the proposals, and they can best be viewed as a continuum
running from limited exemptions, to qualified exemptions, to broad
exemptions. The discussion of the various law reform proposals will be
organized along this continuum. The concluding section in this part of the
Article will critique the various law reform proposals.
A. The Law Reform Proposals
1. Limited Exemptions
Writers who advocate limited experimental use exemptions generally
emphasize the loss of value to patentees that would result if patented
technologies could be freely used for research to develop new or improved
263. See infra Part IV.A.
264. See infra Part IV.A.
265. I do not discuss all of the law reform proposals that have been suggested for an
experimental use exemption. Two noteworthy proposals that have suggested a copyright fair use
approach to an experimental use exemption that are not included in this discussion are: Maureen
A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in PatentLaw, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000)
(concluding that "fair use, by helping to calibrate exclusive rights in a manner informed by patent
policy, is a more desirable, tailored solution to new market conditions") and Donna M. Gitter,
International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the
EuropeanUnion: An Argumentfor Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-UseExemption, 76 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 1623 (2001) (noting that an experimental use exception would allow research for noncommercial purposes by public sector and nonprofit scientists).
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competing technologies. This loss of value to patentees occurs in two
ways. First, the patentee is deprived of royalties from use of the patented
technology in research; that is, developers of new or improved follow-on
technology benefit from the investment in the patented base technology,
but escape paying for the research use of the base technology.266 Second,
the free use of patented technology in research would increase the
2 67
probability of developing new or improved competing technology.
Consequently, consumers might forgo purchasing the base technology in
order to purchase new or improved competing technology as it becomes
available.268
One of the earliest discussions of the experimental use exemption was
published in 1957 by Richard Bee. 269 Bee's ultimate conclusion is that the
experimental use exception "is not warranted as a matter of law or legal
theory, is not consistent with the protection otherwise given the patentee's
rights by the courts, and may serve as a source of judicial confusion and
mischief. '27' Bee's interpretation of the experimental use law is similar to
that of the CAFC majority: The experimental use exemption is reserved
solely for the purpose of "gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or
for mere amusement" and that if there is the slightest business purpose or
profit motive present the exemption is no longer applicable.27'

266. See, e.g., Karp, supra note 244, at 2180.
[C]ommentators [supporting an experimental use exemption] fail to value the
contribution that the patentee may have made to the development of his
competitors' innovations. After all, butfor the patentee's inventive efforts andhis
willingness to disclose the fruits of those efforts, competitors would not even be
in a position to develop a noninfringing alternative or improvement.
Id.
267. Walters, supra note 110, at 529 ("A broad experimental use exception would weaken
patent enforceability and discourage innovations because third parties would wait for someone else
to conceive and make an invention. The free-rider could then copy the patented invention, improve
it under the experimental use exception, and patent the improvement.").
268. Id.
269. Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 357 (1957).
270. Id. at 359.
271. Id. at 375. Bee explained:
Considering all the cases which have passed on the question of experimental use,
it appears that by far the greater majority of the cases have construed the
experimental use exception rather strictly and have held it to be applicable only
where the experiment was for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste,
or curiosity, or for mere amusement. Needless to say, such an occasion will rarely
arise where the experiment is conducted by a business enterprise because business
enterprises simply do not do things merely for amusement, etc.
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A somewhat less limited proposal for an experimental use exemption,
suggested by Michelle Walters, would allow the exemption only for
universities and individuals, and only if they derive no monetary benefit
from the research exemption.272 Walters' proposal posits five acceptable
research uses of patented technology by universities: to verify patent
claims, to use for comparison to a new technology, to gain scientific
knowledge, to use for classroom teaching, and to develop new research
tools donated to the public. 73 Corporate sponsorship of university research
that utilizes patented technology would not eliminate the exemption if the
research results were published and available for use by the public.274
Individuals would be entitled to the experimental use exemption unless
their research was funded by a corporation for commercial purposes.2 75
The Walters proposal would deny the experimental use exemption to
all business entities because their primary objective is to make a profit and
all of their activities, including research, are in pursuit of that profit
objective.276 Walters also suggests that business entities do not need an
experimental use exemption because they can learn about the patented
technology by studying the patent specification, by purchasing the
patented product and obtaining an implied right to experiment with it, or
by obtaining an express license from the patentee to experiment with the
patented technology.277
A similarly limited experimental use exemption has been advanced by
Jordan Karp. Karp argues that a broad experimental use exemption would
retard innovation because industry would be reluctant to file patents and
provide invention disclosures if patented technology could be used without
a license to develop new or improved competing technology. 278 Karp

Id.
272. Walters, supra note 110, at 540.
273. Id. at 535-38.
274. Id. at 538.
275. Id. at 539.
276. Id. at 523-25.
277. Id. at 530-34. Walters suggests that a patentee might be particularly disposed to grant a
license to an experimenter when the purpose of the experimenter is to develop an improvement that
incorporates the original patented invention. Id. at 532. Walters' suggestion assumes that patentees
welcome licensee improvements to their inventions and trust that licensees will not engineer around
their patent. Both assumptions are problematic.
278. Karp, supra note 244, at 2180.
[A] broad experimental use exception, by discouraging inventors from relying on
the patent system, would decrease the level of public disclosure of new inventions
as well as reduce innovative activity in those industries that rely on patent
protection. A broad exception, rather than fostering innovation, would have
exactly the opposite effect.
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would allow an experimental use exemption for the same general purposes
as Walters: to ascertain the truthfulness and accuracy of the patent
specification, to ensure that the patent disclosure complies with the
requirements of § 112, to determine the novelty and non-obviousness of
a subsequent invention, and for purely scientific research with no
foreseeable commercial application." 9 Unlike Walters, however, Karp
would extend the experimental use exemption to corporations and allow
the commercial use of exempted research if the patentee is paid a
"'reasonable royalty"' for the exempted research.2 8 Karp describes this
latter situation as a type of "limited compulsory licens[e]" whereby the
experimenter would have to pay a royalty for the research use of the
patented technology in the event that the research is used to develop a
commercial product or process, regardless of whether or not the
commercial product or process is non-infringing.28 ' In Karp's view, this
arrangement would not discourage filing patent applications and making
invention disclosures because the patentee would be compensated if the
patented invention is used in research for commercial purposes.282
David Parker has proposed another limited experimental use
exemption. Parker believes that a broad experimental use exemption
would be particularly harmful to universities and to the advancement of
basic research. 283 According to Parker, a significant number of university
patents cover basic research subject matter that serves as building blocks
for the eventual development of commercial products or processes.284 If
these basic research patents can be used without a license to develop
commercial products and processes, which in many cases would not
infringe the basic research patent, Parker believes the return on investment

Id.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 2179-80.
Id. at 2188.
Id.
Id.
An experimenter would only have to compensate the patentee when the
experimental activity actually resulted in a benefit to the experimenter (thus,
allowing 'pure' scientific research to continue unhindered). Because experimental
use will only dissuade an inventor from utilizing patent protection to the extent
that an experimenting party is able to develop a competing product, a properly
administered reasonable royalty regime should strike an optimal balance between
the inventor's desire to appropriate the returns on her investment in R&D and the
public's desire for a steady flow of innovations.

Id.
283. Parker, supra note 39, at 659.
284. Id.
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in current basic research needed to support future basic research would be
lost.285 Parker's proposal is similar to Karp's, but more detailed. Parker
would exempt commercial and non-commercial research use of patented
inventions performed by for-profit and nonprofit organizations.286
However, the exempted research use would retroactively become an act
of infringement upon the sale of or the offer to sell any product or process
developed under the research exemption.287 Parker would not allow the
patentee to enjoin the sale of, or the offer to sell, products or processes
developed under the research exemption, thus creating in essence a
compulsory license to use patented inventions in research.288 Finally,
Parker would require a separate license if the product or process developed
under the research exemption would infringe the patented invention used
in the research.289
2. Qualified Exemptions
Probably the most thoughtful and comprehensive article on the
experimental use exemption was published in 1989 by Professor Rebecca
Eisenberg. 29° Eisenberg's article is worth considering in some detail
because of her analysis of the experimental use exemption in the context
of the economic theories that have been advanced to explain the operation
of the patent system. Eisenberg discusses four economic theories of patent
law: the incentive to invent theory, the incentive to disclose theory, the

285. Id.
A significant number of patents that arise out of basic research institutes cover
subject matter that is only a starting point for further development of commercial
products or involve techniques or compositions whose principal value to
commercial licensees is the ability to improve research capability. A statutory
research exemption could thus undermine the value of these basic patents by
rendering them essentially incapable of infringement.
Id. (citation omitted).
286. Id. at 659.
287. Id. at 659-60.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 660.
[I]f the activity results in a product or process within the scope of the patented
technology, the end product or process itself would be actionable without regard
to the underlying technology used in its development. In short, only the research
activities would receive the 'limited-time' protection, not the end result of that
research.
Id.
290. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1017.
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incentive to innovate theory, and the incentive to invest in subsequent
research theory.29 1
The incentive to invent theory posits that patent protection is necessary
to reward investment in research which in turn promotes the public
good.292 Eisenberg does not believe that the incentive to invent theory
provides clear guidance on the experimental use exemption because
analyses of the theory have focused on commercial technology rather than
on basic scientific research. 293 The incentive to disclose theory suggests
that patent protection is necessary to encourage inventors to reveal
information about their inventions rather than keeping this information
secret and unavailable to the public. 294 Although Eisenberg questions
whether secrecy is a practical strategy to protect inventions in many
instances, and whether patent disclosures in fact convey enough
information to be useful to the public, she appears to acknowledge that an
experimental use exemption might diminish the incentive to disclose
information about inventions. 95 The more fundamental problem that
Eisenberg notes with both the incentive to invent and incentive to disclose
theories as guides to an appropriate experimental use exemption is that
there is no empirical evidence on how much incentive is necessary for
optimal levels of invention and disclosure,
or on whether the current level
29 6
of incentive is too high or too lOW.
Eisenberg finds a similar problem with the incentive to innovate
theory. 297 The incentive to innovate theory suggests that the patent

291. Id. at 1028-38.
292. Id. at 1024-26. Eisenberg notes three criticisms of the incentive to invent theory. Id. at
1026-28. First, patent protection might restrict the use of new inventions and thereby reduce their
social benefits. Id. at 1026. Second, patent protection might distort economic activity if firms race
to obtain patents by means of inefficient research efforts. Id. at 1027. Third, patent protection might
hinder progress by providing a disincentive to other persons to make improvements to patented
inventions or to waste time and effort finding duplicative solutions to problems in order to avoid
patent infringement. Id. at 1027-28.
293. Id. at 1030.
294. Id. at 1028.
295. See id. at 1028-30.
296. Id. at 1030.
One might assume that, other things being equal, reducing the strength of patents
would reduce incentives to make and disclose new inventions and that,
conversely, increasing the strength of patents would increase incentives to make
new inventions and to patent them in lieu of protecting them as trade secrets. But
the magnitude of these effects is uncertain. Moreover, it is difficult to say whether
the current level of incentives is too high or too low.
Id.
297. See

id. at 1037.
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monopoly is necessary to promote investment in the post-invention
commercial development of new technologies.298 Eisenberg acknowledges
that the incentive to innovate theory does provide a rationale for postinvention rewards and that the loss of these rewards under an experimental
use exemption could shorten the effective life of the patentee's technology
and deprive the patentee of royalties that would otherwise be collected for
research use of the patentee's technology, and that if this happened the
incentive to innovate would be reduced by some degree.299 However, in the

absence of empirical measurement of the magnitude of these effects,
Eisenberg concludes that the incentive to innovate theory leads to the
"same analytical dead end as the incentive to invent and incentive to
disclose theories: its policy implications turn on empirical questions
without clear answers. ' 3 °
Finally, Eisenberg considers the incentive to invest in subsequent
research theory, commonly referred to as the "'prospect theory."' 3° The
prospect theory holds that patent rights promote efficiency in follow-on
research by allowing the patent owner to monitor and coordinate
subsequent research activity and thereby avoid duplicative and wasteful
resource expenditures.3 °2 Eisenberg notes a number of limitations to the
prospect theory, including its criticism by economists and the incentive for
follow-on researchers to obtain a license in any event if the research might

298. Id. Eisenberg contrasts the incentive to invent theory and incentive to innovate theory:
The incentive to invent theory does not warrant strong patent protection after the point ofinvention
while the incentive to innovate theory warrants strong patent protection throughout the patent term.
Id. at 1037-38.
299. Id. at 1036, 1038. Eisenberg also discusses the Schumpeterian Theory that posits
monopolies are conducive to innovation:
While Schumpeter does not focus exclusively on either technological innovations
or the patent system, his analysis suggests how patent monopolies might promote
technological innovation. He emphatically distinguishes innovation from
invention, noting that invention itself produces "no economically relevant effect
at all." Innovation, on the other hand, brings about incessant revolutionary
changes in the economic system through what Schumpeter calls "a process of
creative destruction."
Id. at 1038-39 (quoting JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, 1BusINESs CYCLES 84 (Transaction reprint, Redvers
Opie trans., 1939) and JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, & DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed.

1950)).
300. Id. at 1040.
301. Id. (quoting Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature & Functionof the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 267-71 (1977)). The "prospect theory" proposed by Edmund Kitch analogizes the
function of patent monopolies to mineral rights in government lands. Id. "Kitch contends that
patents promote efficiency in the use of resources to develop patented inventions in part by putting
patent owners in a position to coordinate subsequent research and development efforts." Id. at 1041.
302. Id. at 1040-43.
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result in an improvement to the patented technology." 3 In the end,
however, Eisenberg does acknowledge that the experimental use
exemption could arguably interfere with the efficient pursuit of follow-on
research. 3 4 She does not note, but could have noted, the lack of empirical
evidence to support the prospect theory as well, and particularly the
assumption that monopoly control over follow-on research activities
produces superior research outcomes than can be achieved through
competition.
Based on her analysis of the economic theories underlying the patent
system and their implications for an appropriate experimental use
exemption, Eisenberg distinguishes three experimental use situations: the
researcher is using a patented research tool for its intended purpose, the
researcher is using patented subject matter to test the validity of the patent
claims, and the researcher is using the patented subject matter to make
further advances in the technology in competition with the patent owner."'
Eisenberg believes that an experimental use exemption is not needed in the
first situation because patentees of research tools will make these tools
available to researchers in the ordinary course of business.3" On the other
side, Eisenberg believes the case for an experimental use exemption is
strongest in the second situation because patent law is intended to promote
the advancement of knowledge and to allow challenges to a patent's
validity.3 "7
-303. Id. at 1043-44.
Thus, while the right to prevent ultimate commercial exploitation of an invention
might sometimes be enough to put patent holders in a position to coordinate
subsequent research efforts to improve their inventions, it seems likely that in
some cases unauthorized (and uncoordinated) research will proceed unless patent
holders have the right to enjoin the use of their inventions in research. In such
cases an experimental use exemption arguably undermines the prospect function,
thus interfering with efficient development of a patent prospect.
Id. at 1044.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1074-75.
306. Id. at 1074. Eisenberg assumes that owners of patented research tools will want to extend
licenses to researchers "in order to extract the full value of the patent monopoly." Id. Other writers
have suggested that "[tlhe primary financial return" to a research tool patentee might come from
exclusive control of the results yielded by the research tool rather than from the widespread use of
the tool itself. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 11, at 123.
307. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1075-76.
Free access to patented inventions for the limited purpose of permitting scrutiny
of new research claims serves the policies underlying the patent law as well as the
interests of research science. Indeed, patent law promotes scrutiny of the research
claims embodied in patented inventions through its requirement that patent
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Eisenberg sees the conflict between the interests of the patent holder
and the interests of subsequent researchers as most intractable when they
are competitors each seeking to develop superior technology."' The
compromise solution that Eisenberg proposes in this situation is to deny
the subsequent researcher an experimental use exemption, but also to deny
the patent owner the right to enjoin the research activity." The result of
this compromise solution is that the patent owner's only remedy would be
reasonable royalty damages; or viewed in another way, the subsequent
researcher would be entitled to a compulsory license to use the patented
technology for research purposes upon payment of reasonable royalty
damages to the patent owner.310
A final noteworthy proposal for a qualified experimental use
exemption has been advanced by Suzanne Michel.311 A major focus of
Michel's concern, similar to that of Parker, is the disadvantage to
universities, research centers, and small firms that could result from a
broad experimental use exemption.312 Michel suggests that these
organizations are the source of major research advances, but they lack the
resources necessary to convert these research advances into commercial
technologies.31 3 If larger firms with much greater resources were able to

holders make enabling disclosures of their inventions freely available to the
public.
Id.
308. Id. at 1075-76. Eisenberg notes that an experimental use exemption in the context of
competitors reduces the value of the patent monopoly in two ways: First, it deprives the patentee
of the royalties that might otherwise be collected from researchers; and second, it shortens the
expected duration of the patent monopoly by lowering the cost to invent around the patent. Id. The
loss of royalties from researchers assumes that the patentee has the right to prohibit the use of the
patented invention by researchers in the first instance. The loss of value of patent monopolies
assumes that patentees will not also benefit from an experimental use exemption that allows them
to perform research on their competitors' inventions just as their competitors can perform research
on their inventions.
309. Id. at 1076-77.
310. Id. at 1077. Eisenberg suggests that damages would not have to be paid to the patentee
for the unauthorized research use of the patented technology if the technology developed by the
researcher is an improvement upon the patented technology that requires a license to
commercialize. Id. However, if the researcher used the patented technology to invent around the
patent, then the researcher would have to pay damages for the unauthorized research use of the
patented technology. Id. at 1077-78.
311. Suzanne T. Michel, Comment, The ExperimentalUse Exception to InfringementApplied
to FederallyFundedInventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369 (1992).
312. Id. at 396-97.
313. Id. at 396.
In general, the patent system appears to be of more value in stimulating invention
and innovation by small rather than large firms. Because the market position of
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use this advanced research without a license, Michel believes that
universities and research centers would lose the licensing revenue needed
to support new research projects and that small firms would lose the
investment capital needed for commercial development of early-stage
research. 14
There are two parts to Michel's experimental use proposal. The first
part is similar to previously discussed proposals while the second part is
novel. The first part of Michel's experimental use proposal would grant
universities and other nonprofit research centers a broad experimental use
exemption; however, if a for-profit firm sought to commercialize the
research undertaken by a nonprofit organization under the benefit of the
experimental use exemption, the firm would have to negotiate a license
with the patentee as if the firm itself had performed the research
initially.315 The second part of Michel' s experimental use exemption would
allow both nonprofit and for-profit organizations to use patented
technology for research purposes if the technology has been developed
with federally-funded research.316 Michel believes that this exemption is
warranted because the goal of the federal government in funding research
a small firm is more vulnerable to imitation by large firms, patents do more to
protect their market position. In addition, small firms will likely be slower at
penetrating new markets through innovation, given their lack of distribution
channels and market acceptance as compared to large firms. For these reasons,
anyone proposing changes to the patent laws should be especially cognizant of
their effect on small firms.
Id. (citation omitted).
314. Id. at 397.
315. Id. at 397-99. Michel claims that a broad experimental use exemption harms the incentive
to invent by "allow[ing] subsequent inventors to free ride on the original inventor's work if the
subsequent inventor can use the original invention to improve on and design around the original
invent[ion]." Id. at 394. There are two responses to Michel's concerns. First, if the subsequent
inventor improves upon the original invention, the subsequent inventor will require a license from
the original inventor prior to commercializing the improved invention and this will provide a return
to the original inventor on her investment in the original invention. Second, if the subsequent
inventor is viewed as a potential free rider on the original inventor's work, the original inventor
must also be viewed as a potential free rider on the subsequent inventor's work. A commercial
experimental use exemption is a two-way street that increases the competition, as well as the risks
and benefits, for all firms in a market.
316. Id. at 400. This proposal would be tantamount to a repeal of the Bayh-Dole Act, 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000) (granting to universities the option to take tide to patents resulting from
federally funded research). The great majority of university patents derive from federally-funded
research. If these patents can be freely used by industry for research their value to universities will
be significantly reduced.
There is some inconsistency between Michel's concern with protecting universities from
unauthorized industry research under a broad experimental use exemption and her allowance of
unauthorized industry research in the case of patents derived from federally-funded research, which
constitute the great majority of universities' patent portfolios. Michel, supra note 311, at 397-400.
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is to encourage additional research and this goal would be undermined if
federally-funded research could not be freely used.3 17 Unlike Michel's
experimental use exemption for universities and research centers,
however, the commercialization of federally-funded research by firms
would only require a license if the resulting commercial product or process
was covered by the patentee's patent claims.318
3. Broad Exemptions
There are three reasons most often given in support of a broad
experimental use exemption: the need to understand how patented
technology works in practice in order to advance knowledge in fields of
science; the need to improve upon, and invent around, patented technology
in order to promote development of new technologies; and the need to
limit the ability of owners of research tools to control downstream
inventions in order to promote competition in technology product and
process markets.319
In a 1985 article, Ronald Hantman undertook the same historical
review of the experimental use exemption as Bee and reached the exact
opposite conclusion-that the case law supports a broad interpretation of
the experimental use exemption.32° Under Hantman's analysis,
commercially motivated research and development to find new uses and
improvements for patented technology should be included within the
experimental use exemption to encourage the innovation of new
technology. 32 Hantman responds directly to the argument that a broad

317. Id. at 402.
318. See id. at 407-08 (noting that anon-licensee could design around a patent thereby creating
a non-infringing work that would nevertheless replace the licensee's product in the marketplace).
319. See, e.g., Barash, supra note 228, at 699-700 (underscoring the need for permitting
researchers to invent around patented technology); Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an
Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 617,640 (1985) (arguing
that research and development ought to be subject to an experimental use exemption in order to
encourage innovation); Mueller, supranote 85, at 11-12 (discussing the need for access to patented
research tools in the field of biotechnology).
320. Hantman, supra note 319, at 618.
A careful review of the case law shows that it does not support the proposition that
the experimental use exception is narrow. Furthermore, an understanding of how
research and development is carried on in modem industry shows that the
exception is necessary for the continued technological advancement of the United
States.
Id. Cf Bee, supra note 269, at 375 (finding a strict interpretation of the experimental use exception
in practice).
321. Hantman, supra note 319, at 639-40 (distinguishing between experimental use on
patented inventions and using patented inventions for experimental purposes). Experimental use
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experimental use exemption would allow persons to use a patented
technology to develop new and improved technologies that could replace
the patented technology in the marketplace.322 In Hantman's opinion,
"that's exactly what the [patent] system is supposed to do. In exchange for
the patent monopoly given to an inventor, the inventor discloses his
invention to the public and runs the risk that his invention may be made
obsolete. '323
The only experimental use law reform proposal that has been put forth
in the form of legislation is the Research, Experimentation and
Competitiveness Act of 1990 (RECA), passed by the House Judiciary
Committee but withdrawn before consideration by the full House of
Representatives. 324 The RECA provided:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make or use a
patented invention solely for research or experimentation
purposes unless the patented invention has a primary purpose
of research or experimentation. If the patented invention has
a primary purpose of research or experimentation, it shall not
be an act of infringement to manufacture or use such
invention to study, evaluate, or characterize such
invention . 325
The proposed RECA did not distinguish between for-profit and
nonprofit research organizations, nor between commercial and
noncommercial research purposes; in each of these instances, a third party
would be allowed to make or use patented technology to perform scientific
research, to improve upon patented technology, and to engineer around
patented technology. 326 The only distinction drawn in the RECA for the

on patented inventions would be allowed under Hantman's proposal because it would result in
improvements to patented inventions and new scientific knowledge. Id. Using patented inventions
for experimental purposes would not be allowed under Hantman's proposal because it would not
result in improvements to patented inventions and would allow the experimenter to profit at the
expense of the patent owner. Id.
322. Id. at 643.
323. Id. Hantman defines research and development as activities "carried out to discover
something new, sometimes for pure knowledge and other times for commercial application." Id.
at 640. He defines innovation as "the entire process of recognizing a problem, identifying a new
solution (through research), and developing and marketing an economically attractive process or
product." Id. Hantman believes research and development "ought to be included within the
experimental use exception in order to encourage and support the innovation of new technology."
Id.
324. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. §§ 401-403 (1990).
325. Id. § 402.
326. H.R. REP. No. 101-960, pt. 1, at 9-10 (1990). The House Report quoted noted patent
authority, Harold C. Wegner, who argued:
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experimental use exemption was based on the intended use of the patented
subject matter; if the patented subject matter was primarily intended for
use in performing research (a research tool), then it could not be made or
used for its intended purpose without a license, although it could be made
or used to perform scientific research outside of the research tool's
intended use, either to improve upon the research tool, or to engineer
around the research tool. 327 One of the proposals for a broad experimental
use exemption would support the adoption of a limited version of the
RECA, while other proposals would support an expanded version of the
RECA.
Eyal Barash has argued for a limited adoption of the RECA exemption
only for universities and nonprofit research centers.32 The focus of
Barash's concern is the risk of infringement lawsuits against universities
and nonprofit research centers based on their use of patented technologies
for research and experimentation purposes.32 9 In Barash's view, the scope
of this risk is increasing, especially for universities, due to two sets of
factors. The first set of factors involves changes in the patent laws and the
general way in which university researchers pursue research projects.33 °

It is ludicrous to expect every researcher to obtain a license in advance of
conducting a simple experiment, each time he sees a newly issued patent and
attempts to duplicate the efforts in his laboratory. It is equally ludicrous and
burdensome if every Ph.D. research [sic] in a New Jersey pharmaceutical
organization would need to have a patent attorney sitting at his side, to first opine
whether his research for the day was within the scope of a third party's patent, and
then to obtain a license because he [might] tap his test tubes and precipitate out
the 'infringing' product! (While, the fellow Ph.D. working in a sister facility in
Basel, Paris or the Rhine would be totally immune from this onerous
requirement.).
Id. at 8.
327. Id. at 9 ("The easiest method of limiting and describing the 'experimental use of research
exception' is to differentiate between experimentation on a patented invention and experimentation
using a patented invention in order to accomplish another purpose, the former type of
experimentation constituting the scope of the exception.").
328. Barash, supra note 228, at 697-98.
329. See id. at 697-99.
Universities, in cooperation with industry, may find themselves embroiled in
costly intellectual property litigation.... The effect of extensive patent litigation
against universities may chill many research activities, not just those in which an
invention may be patented, by requiring researchers to investigate whether their
proposed laboratory research infringes any known patent.
Id. at 698.
330. Id. at 697-98. "In 1980 and again in 1984, the patent laws of the United States were
changed so that universities could keep the titles to patents issued based on federally-funded
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Congress amended the patent laws in 1984 to allow universities to license
patents resulting from federally-funded research, 331' and Barash notes that
this amendment has lead to greatly increased research and patenting
activity by universities. 33' At the same time, however, university
researchers continue to pursue research projects as they have in the past,
taking little account of patent rights and rarely performing patent searches
prior to undertaking research projects. 333 The combination of the increased
research and patenting activity coupled with the traditional neglect of
patent rights, Barash believes, increases the risk of infringement lawsuits
against universities.334
The second set of factors Barash sees increasing the risk of
infringement suits against universities involves industries' responses to the
changing university research environment.335 As university research
becomes more valuable, Barash predicts that corporations will have an
increasing commercial interest in university research-sometimes having
interests aligned with the university and sometimes having interests
antagonistic to the university. 336 In either case, Barash believes industry's
growing commercial interest in university research increases the risk of
infringement litigation and threatens the advancement of research
activities.337
Three other writers, Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss, Janice Mueller, and
Katherine Strandburg, have advocated experimental use exemptions
broader than the RECA. Dreyfuss, Mueller, and Strandburg are primarily
concerned with the use of patented research tools to control downstream
inventions and each has proposed some form of compulsory license to
address this problem. 338 Although these authors do not explicitly

research projects .... Patents issued to universities are often licensed to industry in the hope of
developing commercially useful products and processes." Id. at 697.
331. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)).
332. Barash, supra note 228, at 697.
333. Id. at 697-98 ("At the heart of the problem lies the manner in which research occurs at
universities. University researchers rarely check the patent literature to determine whether their
proposed research will infringe on any patents.").
334. Id. at 698.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 698-99 ("As the value of university licenses continues to increase and as federal
funds become harder to get, university researchers may face increasing opposition from
corporations who may vehemently attempt to prevent their intellectual property from being used
or sold.").
338. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protectingthe Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 471-72 (2004) (proposing the use of
waivers); Mueller, supra note 85, at 66 (discussing a "liability rule"); Strandburg, supra note 11,
at 143-44 (discussing an "initial exclusivity period").
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recommend the adoption of the RECA, one would assume that if they
support compulsory licenses for the use of research tools for their intended
purpose they would also support the RECA exemptions for the use of
research tools and nonresearch tools for the purposes of scientific research,
technology improvement, and development of new, non-infringing
technology.
Dreyfuss proposes an experimental use exemption similar to Barash's
proposal that would apply only to nonprofit research institutions.339
However, Dreyfuss articulates a far broader set of concerns than Barash,
and her proposal is considerably more detailed."n Dreyfuss suggests that
the progress of scientific research and technology innovation, especially
in the field of biotechnology, is being thwarted by a combination of three
factors: a change in the character of science, a transformation in the
organization of science, and a shift in public policies governing
information production and sharing.341
The change Dreyfuss perceives in the character of science is the
growing merger of fundamental research and commercial products.342 She
notes, for example, that in the fields of genomics and proteomics, basic
scientific discoveries often have immediate commercial applications as
medical diagnostic devices or disease treatments and therefore qualify for
patent protection; however, these same basic scientific discoveries are also
critical to innovation in a host of other technologies.343 Dreyfuss attributes
the change in the organization of science primarily to the rapidly changing
role of universities in the research enterprise. 3 ' Dreyfuss describes past
university research as freely available to both academic and commercial
scientists under an ethos of a free and open exchange of scholarship;
however, Dreyfuss suggests that today universities are "deep in the
intellectual property business" and their technology transfer offices are
often seen as a source of revenue to reduce tuition costs, decrease the
burden on alumni and, for state-supported universities, lower the taxes on
state residents. 34" Finally, Dreyfuss believes that the public policies

339. Dreyfuss, supra note 338, at 471.
340. Id. at 471-72; cf.Barash, supra note 228, at 697-99.
341. Dreyfuss, supra note 338, at 462-66.
342. Id. at 462-63 (referring to the blurring of the dichotomy between fundamental and enduse work in biotechnology).
343. Id. Dreyfuss describes past science as a "linear progression from basic science, to applied
science, to commercializable technology, to consumer end-products. That conception was
essentially hardwired into the law. The developments at the end of that progression were patentable,
the developments along the rest of the trail were not." Id. at 462 (citation omitted).
344. Id. at 463-65.
345. Id. at 463-64. Dreyfuss is quite critical of university technology transfer offices.
their technology transfer offices as the
to regard2006
have also begun
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governing information production and sharing have shifted from a
preference for a strong public domain in which information was freely
available to all to a preference for protecting all creative works as
intellectual property. 346Within this milieu, Dreyfuss finds it unsuprising
that faculty and universities seek intellectual property protection for their
creative efforts.347
The solution Dreyfuss proposes to resolve the conflict between
intellectual property rights and the progress of scientific research and
technology innovation is to replenish the public domain by allowing
universities to use patented research tools for their intended purpose, but
to place conditions on how universities can use the results of such
research.' Specifically, Dreyfuss would allow the unlicensed use of
research tools if the research tools were not available on reasonable terms,
the researcher agreed to publish the results of the research, and the
researcher agreed to refrain from patenting the results of the research.349
Richard Nelson has suggested a modification of Dreyfuss's proposal. He

academic equivalent of their football teams: even if the offices aren't winning,
there is cachet in fielding them. And the technology transfer offices want to win,
just like the football teams do. They are judged by the number of patents granted
and the value of the licenses negotiated. And so they have tremendous incentives
to obtain every patent that they can get and to argue for more protection for the
work that universities do, which is to say, for developments that are far more
upstream.
Id. at 464.
346. Id. at 465 ("As Professor Jerry Reichman has so graphically put it, the classical patent
and copyright systems were once islands of protection in a sea of competition. Now what we have
is a sea of protection in which intrepid entrepreneurs encounter remote islands of free
competition.").
347. Id. at 466.
Put these developments together and it is clear why the issues of protecting the
public domain of science and creating room to experiment have become so
compelling. Patentees can now own-and many think they deserve to own--entire
research opportunities, rights not only in product markets, the traditional markets
that patents dominate, but rights in innovation markets as well. Patentees can
exploit these innovation markets by doing research. They can license others to
exploit them if they so choose. But they can also leave them unexplored.
Id.
348. Id. at471.
349. Id. Dreyfuss notes some alternative approaches to the problems she describes that do not
depend upon an experimental use exemption, including redefining patentable subject matter to
exclude fundamental principals of science, making patents more difficult to obtain by heightening
the standards for utility and non-obviousness, changing the test for infringement by narrowing or
eliminating the doctrine of equivalence, and amending the Bayh-Dole Act to make it easier for the
federal government to control the use of patents derived through federal funding. Id. at 468-70.
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would allow nonprofit research institutions to patent research results
obtained through the unlicensed use of research tools provided the
institution agreed to license the results on a nonexclusive basis and upon
reasonable terms and conditions.35 °
Mueller also believes that there is a serious problem today with the
" ' Mueller argues that Eisenberg's position
availability of research tools.35
on the use of patented research tools is increasingly untenable in the
current research environment.352 Recall that Eisenberg proposed that the
use of research tools for their intended purpose should not be covered by
an experimental use exemption because research tools were readily
available to ordinary users with minimal transaction costs. 353 Mueller
asserts that research tools today often are not freely available for purchase
by ordinary consumers and that when they are available the frequent need
for multiple research tools creates a problem of royalty stacking, which
greatly
increases the transaction costs involved in licensing research
35 4
tools.

Mueller also does not believe that Eisenberg's proposed experimental
use exemption for the use of research tools in order to improve upon them
or to engineer around them is sufficient to address the problem of control
over downstream inventions.355 Mueller agrees with Dreyfuss that
technology advances in one field often spill over into other fields; Mueller
gives as examples a genetically-modified mouse that might be used to
screen drugs for treatment of cancers or a DNA chip that might be used to
identify genetic variations associated with diseases.3 56 Mueller does not
think that the use of patented technologies in these ways would fall within
Eisenberg' s proposed experimental use exemption. However, in Mueller's
view, these activities could result in new products that357
are much more
valuable to society than new or improved research tools.
Under Mueller's proposal, patented research tools that are not "readily
available for licensing on reasonable terms" could be used by third parties
for their intended research purpose without a license to develop
commercial products.358 In exchange for the unlicensed uses of patented

350. Id. at 471. Dreyfuss takes Nelson's suggestion as a "friendly amendment." Id.
351. Mueller, supra note 85, at 57.
352. Id.
353. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1074.
354. Mueller, supra note 85, at 57.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 57-58.
357. Id. ("To the extent that [the users] are not improving the technology of the research tool
patent itself (i.e., resulting in improved research tools of the same type), these trans-technologic
uses of research tools would appear to fall outside the.. .'improver' prong of Professor Eisenberg's
model.").
358. Id. at 58. Mueller does not define "readily available for licensing" or "reasonable terms."
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research tools, patentees would be entitled to "reach-through royalt[ies]"
on the products developed with the use of their research tools.35 9 Mueller
believes that this arrangement would be fair to both third party product
developers and to research tool patentees because the royalty payments
would be linked to the commercial success of the resulting products and
therefore approximate the value of the research tools to the tool users-the
product developers. 360 To implement this model, Mueller would require
the third-party user to notify the research tool patentee in advance of the
tool's use. 361 Finally, Mueller suggests alternative methods by which
reach-through royalties could be determined.362
Strandburg supports Mueller's proposal, but with an important
modification. Strandburg suggests a two-term system of compulsory
licensing for research tool patents: During the first term, approximately
three to five years, the research tool would be under the exclusive control
of the research tool patentee; during the second term, the remainder of the
patent's life, the research tool would be subject to compulsory licensing
by third parties upon payment of a reasonable royalty to the research tool
patentee.363 Strandburg sees a number of benefits in this modification to
Mueller's proposal. First, the initial exclusivity period would allow
patentees the opportunity to control downstream inventions developed
using their research tools either by directly performing the research
themselves or by collaborating with other researchers. 3 ' The initial
exclusivity period would also allow patentees the opportunity to recoup
their investment in research tools through private market transactions
before the tools become subject to compulsory license. 365 Finally, the
initial exclusivity period would provide a frame of reference for the
determination of reasonable royalty rates when the compulsory license
term begins.366

See id.
359. Id.
360. Id. ("The new products [developed from the use of the research tool] would serve as the
royalty base. In this manner the royalty payment to the research tool patentee would approximate
the true value of the research tool to the tool user and product developer.") (citation omitted).
361. Id. at 58-59. Mueller would not require the third-party user to disclose the nature or
details of the intended use of the research tool. Id. at 59.
362. Id. at 63-65. These methods include the "heuristic approach" rule where the licensor
receives twenty-five percent of the licensee's pre-tax profits on its sales, and the "'analytical
approach,"' which calculates the royalty as the "'residual between the infringer's anticipated net
profit from practicing the infringed invention and the infringer's normal net profit."' Id. at 64-65
(quoting Richard S. Toikka, PatentLicensing UnderCompetitiveandNon-Competitive Conditions,
82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 279, 292, 294 (2000)).
363. Strandburg, supra note 11, at 143.
364. Id. at 143-44.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 143-45.
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B. Critiqueof the Law Reform Proposals
This Part will first consider the law reform proposals directed to enduser products and processes, and then consider the special case of research
tools. The narrowest experimental use proposal (Bee) would allow
infringement immunity only where the experimentation was for "mere
amusement," regardless of whether the experimentation was performed by
a for-profit or nonprofit organization.367 This is essentially the same
interpretation of the experimental use exemption adopted by the CAFC in
Madey v. Duke University.36 8 The problems that result from such a narrow
interpretation of the experimental use exemption were discussed in detail
in the first part of this Article.3 69 These problems include the retardation
of innovation, competition, and consumer welfare, and the contradictions
between such a narrow exemption and other patent law policies.37°
The broadest experimental use proposals (Hantman and RECA) would
exempt experimentation by any organization for any purpose. 371 These
proposals would allow the use of patented subject matter by nonprofit and
for-profit organizations to test the validity of patent claims, to test the
accuracy of patent disclosures, to improve upon the patented subject, and
to develop noninfringing substitute technology, regardless of whether the
purpose was noncommercial or commercial. This experimental use "freefor-all" would undoubtedly advance innovation and competition in the
private sector which would, in turn, increase consumer welfare. What is
uncertain about such a broad experimental use exemption is its impact on
universities and basic research.
A broad experimental use exemption would allow universities to
experiment with industries' patented subject matter, for noncommercial or
commercial purposes, without fear of infringement liability. This would
clearly spur universities' already active research and patenting efforts and
promote technology innovation and consumer welfare. However, a broad
experimental use exemption would also allow industry to experiment with
university-patented subject matter without infringement liability. Parker
and other writers have expressed concern over this prospect.3 72 These
writers believe that the majority of patents arising from university research
cover basic research subject matter and that this subject matter serves as
the building block for further research and development of commercial
367. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
368. See 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
369. See supra Part II.
370. See supra Part M.A.
371. See supra notes 320-27 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 314-17 and
accompanying text.
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products and processes.373 Their fear is that industry would be able to use
university basic research patents to develop commercial products and
processes not covered by the patents and that this would deprive
universities of a return on their investment in basic research.3 74 If this
outcome occurred, it would harm university research generally, basic
research specifically, and ultimately innovation, competition, and
consumer welfare.
The middle-ground experimental use proposals would generally allow
non-commercial use of patented subject matter for such purposes as testing
patent specifications and disclosures, determining novelty and nonobviousness, and conducting scientific research. However, these proposals
would require some form of compulsory license and royalty payment in
the event the exempted research was used for commercial purposes.375
Supporters of this compromise approach believe it allows for sufficient use
of patented technology to promote public knowledge and scientific
progress, while protecting patentees from two economic harms: (1)
forfeiture of royalties for the research use of patented technology; and (2)
loss of the competitive advantage based on the patentee's exclusive
research use of patented technology.376 Both of these asserted economic
harms are dubious. The first rests on the circular association of royalty
rights and patent rights; a patentee does not lose royalties for the research
use of patented subject matter unless the patent rights are defined to cover
such use.377 If the CAFC's extremely narrow experimental use exemption
is reversed by later cases or legislation, would the change be a deprivation
of royalty rights,37 8 a taking of patent property rights,37 9 or a clarification
of the scope of patent protection? 380 The second asserted economic harm

373. See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text; see also Michel, supra note 311, at 402.
374. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
377. See Strandburg, supra note 11, at 96 ("Thus, the 'emoluments which [a patentee] does
or might receive from the practice of the invention by himself or others' are necessarily defined by
the legal boundaries of the patentee's rights. To decide whether a particular unauthorized use
deprives the patentee of legitimate returns, one must know whether the unauthorized use falls
within the experimental-use exemption.") (quoting WiLLIAM C. ROBINSON, 3 THE LAW OFPATENTS
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 898 (1890)) (alteration in original).
378. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2000) ("In addition to other rights provided by this section, a
patent shall include the right to obtain a reasonable royalty from any person who ... makes, uses,
offers for sale, or sells.., the invention... [in] the United States.").
379. See, e.g., Evan Ackiron, Patentsfor Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case, 17 AM.
J.L. & MED. 145, 175 (1991) ("In general, legislative changes that affect existing property rights
may constitute a takings [sic] and thus require compensation to patentees, while measures that
apply to the granting of the patent are not likely to have this effect.").
380. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1638 (2003).
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rests on the questionable proposition that a patent grants the patentee
freedom from competition. It does not. A patent gives the patentee the
right to exclude others from using the patented subject matter for direct
commercial gain; it does not immunize the patented subject matter from
competition or guarantee its commercial success. 381 Excluding
commercially-motivated research from an experimental use exemption in
order to protect the patentee from competition confuses monopoly over the
patent subject matter with monopoly over the patent subject matter market.
More fundamentally, innovation, competition, and consumer welfare
cannot be advanced if commercial research is excluded from an
experimental use exemption. The inclusion of commercial research in an
experimental use exemption would intensify competition in technologybased industries and force firms to invest more heavily in research and
development to protect existing market share and capture new market
share. It should also be noted that the inclusion of commercial research in
an experimental use exemption would be a two-way street. Firms would
be vulnerable to competitors who used their patented technology to
develop superior, non-infringing technology, but firms would also have the
opportunity to respond in kind. The likely result of these new research
opportunities would be a more competitive market environment in which
some firms would become more successful, some firms would become
less successful, and some firms would be driven from the market. This is
a natural and desirable consequence of increased competition, and it would
provide consumers with higher quality goods, lower prices, and more
product choices.
All of the middle-ground experimental use proposals include some
form of compulsory licensing.3 82 There is considerable debate over
compulsory licenses in the United States and abroad, especially in the
context of pharmaceutical and agricultural technologies.383 Regardless of
the outcome of this broader debate, it is highly doubtful that compulsory
licenses provide a viable solution to the experimental use problem in the

While the [Patent Act] sets the basic parameters for patentability and
infringement, it does not specify in detail how those basic principles are to be
applied. Further, in many instances, such as application of the doctrine of
equivalents or of unenforceability, judicially created doctrines play a major role
in defining the scope of patent protection.
Id.
381. See, e.g., Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisionsfor Pharmaceuticals:Have
They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 393 (1999) ("Whether or not the patent owner
derives a commercial benefit... is a matter that is totally divorced from the patent system.").
382. See supra Part IV.A.2.
383. See Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory
Licensing of PharmaceuticalsHurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 853, 858-64 (2003).
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United States. In the context of U.S. domestic patent law, compulsory
license proposals are fraught with practical, policy, and political problems.
The practical problems include determining what facts would trigger
the availability of the compulsory license,384 what terms and conditions
would be included in the compulsory license,385 and what royalties would
be paid under the compulsory license.386 Of these problems, the royalty
determinations would be the most difficult, requiring consideration of a
complex set of factors such as industry standard licensing rates, the degree
of risk associated with the license, the stage of development of the
licensed technology, the value of the licensed technology to the licensee,
and the prospect of multiple royalty payments.387
The policy problems associated with compulsory licenses arise from
their implications for private property rights generally, and patent
ownership rights specifically. Compulsory licenses, no matter how they

384. For example, one commentator has noted that "Ibly 1977, the [FTC] and DOJ had issued
approximately 125 [compulsory license] decrees over thousands of patents and a wide range of
technology ... in the context of mergers, price-fixing, and the abuse of monopoly or market
power." Chien, supra note 383, at 862; see also Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property
Rights in Genetic Material,29-30 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper
No. 152, 2003), availableat http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (noting that patent
holders will be unaware that potential licensees have even begun working with the patented
material unless "licensees post on some neutral site a notice of its [sic] 'intention to use' the
covered materials of another company, and to subject that party to heavy damages in the event that
they proceed without supplying the requisite notice").
385. See Epstein, supra note 384, at 30-32 (analyzing the Harvard License Agreement and
discussing the complexity of potential licensing terms, including conduct of the licensee and its
affiliates, definitions (especially of "net sales"), best efforts clauses, cooperation provisions,
regulatory compliance terms, international use, etc.). Epstein also points out that the terms of any
compulsory license would likely need to be much more extensive than their "voluntary
counterparts," largely because under a forced licensing scheme, the parties will not share the same
levels of "informal, reputational or relational sanctions to help keep each other in line," which will
in turn increase the need for "explicit monitoring." Id. at 34.
386. Chien, supra note 383, at 869-70 (discussing the compulsory licensing terms of the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), which state that
"patentees are to receive 'adequate remuneration ... taking into account the economic value of the
authorization' (quoting Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lc, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, art. 3 1(h) I.L.M. 81 (1994))).
387. See Epstein, supra note 384, at 32, 33 (noting that all of these variables make the
selection of one "standard" rate almost impossible to determine, because if the standard were set
too high without regard to the risk associated with the licensee's particular stage of research
development, then "no potential licensee will seek to exercise its rights under the compulsory
scheme"; on the other hand, setting the rate too low will mean that the licensor will not be able to
"recoup its expenditures with a reasonable rate of return," which means that "the product, if made
at all, will be gobbled up by a large number of nonexclusive licenses which might yield too little
in revenue to encourage systematic investment over time.").
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are implemented, constitute a taking of private property.388 Although the
federal government has the unquestioned authority to take private property
for public purposes upon payment of just compensation,389 this authority
is rarely exercised in the realm of personal property. Because the courts
have characterized patent rights as personal property,39 many persons
would view the creation of compulsory patent licenses as a troublesome
precedent for the taking of other personal property. The same concern
would exist for patent ownership rights. If compulsory patent licenses can
be created for the purpose of research, why can they not also be created for
the purpose of limiting firms' market dominance or lowering product
prices? Finally, the political problem associated with compulsory patent
licenses, which is directly related to the policy problems, is that it is highly
unlikely that compulsory patent licenses could ever marshal sufficient
support in either political party to be enacted into law.
Given the many problems that compulsory patent licensing would
entail, one wonders why it is the preferred solution of so many law review
writers, and why these writers would propose compulsory patent licensing
to overcome the CAFC's elimination of the common law experimental use
exemption, rather than propose a reversal of the CAFC' s experimental use
decisions through judicial appeals and legislative reforms. It certainly
would be easier to deny patentees the right to control the use of patented
technology in research and development in the first instance, than to
preserve the patentees' rights and then attempt to limit them through
compulsory licensing.
Finally, I turn to the law reform proposals that have been suggested for
patented research tools, all of which also include some form of
compulsory licensing. I will first consider the rationales advanced in
support of these law reform proposals before turning to the proposals
themselves. Initially, it should be noted that the concern over access to
research tools is focused solely on the biotechnology industry;3 91 there is
apparent agreement that research tools in other industrial settings are
readily available through marketplace transactions.392 The evidence cited
by writers to support the lack of access to research tools in the
biotechnology industry, however, is almost entirely anecdotal. One article

388. See Chien, supra note 383, at 862-63. She notes that for this reason, 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(2000) was enacted to immunize the U.S. Government from liability for using inventions without
the patentee's permission. Id. The statute merely provides that the government must provide
"'reasonable and entire compensation' for the use, and does not permit the patentee to maintain
an injunctive action against the government. Id. at 863 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000)).
389. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
390. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
391. See Mueller, supra note 85, at 11.
392. See id.
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cites two examples of firms that attempted to control downstream
393
invention through ownership of research tools, both unsuccessfully.
Another article claims a "high percentage" of basic research tools in
biotechnology are patented, but cites no factual evidence that this has
caused a serious industry problem. 394 The only empirical study to date
concluded that although there was some indication that a problem in
accessing research tools could arise in the future, there was no evidence
of an existing problem even remotely warranting congressional concern.395
The lack of hard evidence of a problem regarding access to research
tools in the biotechnology industry can perhaps be explained by the special
conditions that must exist in order for a research tool patentee to exercise
control over downstream inventions. First, there must be no close
substitutes for the patented research tool; second, there must be no close
substitutes for the research projects that require the tool; third, the research
tool patentee must have sufficient expertise to identify the most promising
research projects; and fourth, the research tool patentee must have
sufficient expertise to pursue product development independently or to
select the outside researcher best able to do so. 396 Because the knowledge
required for development of a research tool might be very different than
the knowledge required for development of a product using the research
tool, even patentees that have a unique tool might be unable to control
downstream inventions.397
The lack of empirical evidence of a problem with respect to access to
research tools is especially troubling because the compulsory licensing
proposals in this area are the most drastic. The compulsory licensing
proposals advanced for end-use product and process research do not allow
for the use of products and processes for their intended purposes. These
compulsory licensing proposals are solely for the purpose of allowing
research to be performed upon patented technology. The compulsory
licensing proposals suggested for research tools would allow for their use
for the very purpose for which the tool was developed. This would have
an immediate, negative financial impact upon research tool patentees that
could result in diminished investment in development of research tools in
the future. In light of this dire prospect, it would seem that compelling
evidence of an access problem in the research tool market would be

393. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 699.
394. See Mueller, supra note 85, at 11.
395. See Dreyfuss, supra note 338, at 460 (citing John P. Walsh et al., Effects ofResearch Tool
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen et al. eds., 2003)).
396. See Strandburg, supra note 11, at 124-28.
397. Id. at 131-32.
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required before proposing a compulsory licensing scheme.
V. PROPOSED ASYMMETRIC EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION

This Part of the Article will describe a proposed asymmetric
experimental use exemption, discuss the patent subject matter and allowed
uses included within the proposed exemption, suggest statutory language
for the implementation of the proposed exemption, and discuss the
benefits of the proposed exemption.
A. Description of ProposedExemption
An experimental use exemption is essential to promote innovation,
competition, and consumer welfare. The asymmetric experimental use
exemption proposed here would be a statutory infringement exemption
that would apply to all patent subject matter. It would be similar to the
RECA experimental use bill discussed above,39 except in two significant
respects. Similar to the RECA, the asymmetric experimental use
exemption would allow for the research use of patented subject matter for
commercial and noncommercial purposes, it would be available to forprofit and nonprofit organizations, and it would not include any form of
compulsory licensing.3
The first major difference between the proposed asymmetric
experimental use exemption and the RECA bill is that the proposed
experimental use exemption would provide differential access
(asymmetric access) to patent subject matter for corporations, small
businesses, and nonprofit research organizations." The differential access
to patent subject matter is necessary to protect the investment of small
technology businesses and nonprofit research organizations in basic
scientific research. As noted earlier, these entities are the primary source
of basic scientific research, but often lack the resources necessary to
convert this basic research into commercially viable technologies. 4 1 If
large firms with far greater resources were permitted to experiment with
these basic scientific advances without a license, they could develop
commercially viable technologies that do not infringe the basic research
patents and thus deprive the small business or nonprofit research center of
any return on their investment in the basic research. 2 To the extent this
occurs, small businesses will have a much more difficult time raising
early-stage investment capital to fund further technology development,

398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

324-25
324-25
324-25
283-89
372-74

and
and
and
and
and

accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
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and nonprofit research organizations will be deprived of license revenue
to fund future research projects.
For non-small business corporations, the experimental use exemption
would cover only patent subject matter owned by other non-small business
corporations, and not patent subject matter owned by small business
corporations and nonprofit research organizations. For small business
corporations, the experimental use exemption would cover patent subject
matter owned by non-small business corporations, nonprofit research
organizations, and other small business corporations. Likewise for
nonprofit research organizations, the experimental use exemption would
cover patent subject matter owned by non-small business corporations,
small business corporations, and other nonprofit research organizations.403
The drawing below depicts the differential access to patent subject matter
under an asymmetric experimental use exemption.
Asymmetric Access to Patent Subject Matter

Non-Small Busness Corporations

Non-Small Busness Corporations

Non-Profit Research Organizations

Non-Profit Research Organizations

Small Busness Corporations

Small Buiness Corporations

T

The nonprofit research organizations would include universities,
federal laboratories, research hospitals, and research institutes. The
definition of small business corporations would have to be determined
through legislative deliberation and could include such factors as annual
sales, number of employees, research and development spending, and
years since founding. An appropriate definition of small business
corporations would balance the need to protect the investment in basic
scientific research made by small technology businesses and the need to
promote innovation and competition in technology industries. 4°

403. Individual researchers would be included in the group of small business corporations and
nonprofit research organizations.
404. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) definition of a "small business" could
provide a starting point for discussion of the definition of a small business for purposes of the
proposed experimental use exemption. See Guide to SBA's Definitions of Small Business,
http://www.sba.gov/gopher/Financial-Assistance/Defin/defi4.txt (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
Although the SBA's definition of a small business varies between different industry segments, the
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In order for an asymmetric experimental use exemption to work
properly, non-small business corporations must be prohibited from
indirectly accessing patent subject matter that they could not directly
access. There are a number of means by which non-small business
corporations could seek indirect access to patent subject matter that they
could not access directly, including the formation of small business
corporation subsidiaries, partnerships with small business corporations,
and research agreements with nonprofit research organizations. For
example, a non-small business corporation (Corp. X) could enter into a
research agreement with a nonprofit research organization (ResOrg. A)
and by means of that agreement gain indirect access to patent subject
matter owned by a small business corporation (Corp. Y). Under the
asymmetric experimental use exemption, Corp. Y's patent subject matter
could be used by ResOrg. A, but could not be used by Corp. X.
The problem of indirect access to exempted patent subject matter can
be solved by clearly providing in the asymmetric experimental use
exemption that it is an act of infringement for a non-small business
corporation to use research results obtained from exempted
experimentation with patent subject matter by a small business corporation
or a nonprofit research organization. If a non-small business corporation
wants to use the research results obtained from exempted experimentation
with patent subject matter, the corporation must obtain a license from the
owner of the patent subject matter just as if the non-small business
corporation sought to use the patent subject matter directly in the first
instance.
The second major difference between the proposed asymmetric
experimental use exemption and the RECA is that the proposed exemption
would define more fully the patent subject matter included under the
exemption and the purposes for which this patented subject could be
used. 5 Although the RECA is eloquent in its two-sentence simplicity, it
provides little guidance in determining what patented inventions are to be
characterized as research tools and what uses of research tools are to be
exempted. 6 The definitional approach of the proposed experimental use
exemption is discussed below.
It should be noted that even if a statutory experimental use exemption
for all patented inventions is enacted, there would still be situations in
which a researcher might seek to obtain a license from a patentee prior to
commencing the research. For example, if the objective of the researcher

two widely-used measures to define a small business are under 500 employees for manufacturing
industries and under $6 million in average annual revenue for non-manufacturing industries. See
id.
405. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
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is to further the development of the technology for its intended purpose,
or to improve upon the technology, the researcher might well seek a
license from the patentee before making a significant investment in the
research project. In both of these cases, if the research is successful, the
researcher will have to obtain a license to the underlying technology
before she can commercialize the research. Knowing this, a researcher
might decide to negotiate a license with the patentee before the research
is started in order to avoid paying a higher price for the license at a later
date if the research proves successful.'""
B. Definition of PatentSubject Matter and Allowed Uses Under
the ProposedExemption
The unavoidable and most difficult challenge in implementing any
experimental use exemption or compulsory license is defining the patent
subject matter and allowed uses covered by the exemption or license. The
major challenge in defining the patent subject matter is distinguishing
between end-use products and processes, and the research tools used to
create end-use products and processes; as noted earlier, this distinction is
necessary to foster innovation and competition in end-use products and
processes
while not harming investment in the creation of new research
408
tools.
There have been many different attempts to define research tools. Part
I of this Article discussed the disagreement on the CAFC over the

407. See Clarisa Long, ProprietaryRights and Why InitialAllocationsMatter,49 Emory L.J.
823, 835 (2000).
Rational licensees would prefer to negotiate a licensing amount sooner rather than
later, so as to fix one more variable in their downstream research risk equation.
Licensees must subtract the cost of the license from the profitability of the
commercial end-product and thus will be willing to pay only if they anticipate that
the cost of the license will allow a sufficient return on investment. No innovator
wants to be in the position of having to pay licensing fees, however small, for the
use of a patent that turned out to be a dud. And no patent holder wants to hear that
it will not be receiving licensing revenues because its patent turned out to be one
of the majority of patents that ultimately is not commercially viable.
Id. The situation is different, however, if the researcher is performing research as part of a scientific
investigation without any intent to commercialize the research results, or if the researcher is
performing research in an attempt to engineer around the patent and develop a new, non-infringing
technology. In these two cases, the researcher would not be required to secure a license to the
underlying technology at a later date (in the first instance because there will be no
commercialization and in the second instance because commercialization will be achieved through
non-infringing technology) and therefore would have no reason to negotiate a license prior to
beginning the research.
408. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
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definition of research tools and described the NIH definition of research
tools. 4' A number of writers have also attempted to define research tools.
Mueller, for example, has defined research tools as "those patented tools
used in development of new biotechnological or pharmaceutical products
that do not themselves physically incorporate the tool."41
Likewise, there have been many other attempts to define the allowed
uses of research tools either under an experimental use exemption or
compulsory license. As discussed earlier, the proposed RECA
experimental use exemption would have allowed the use of research tools
for the purpose of study, evaluation, and the creation of new, noninfringing research tools.4 ' Additionally, a number of the compulsory
license proposals distinguish between non-commercial and commercial
uses of research tools.4 12 One of the most thoughtful attempts to define the
allowed use of research tools has been suggested by Strandburg.
Strandburg distinguishes between "'experimenting on' a patented
research tool (using the inventive idea contained in the patent for followon innovation) and "'experimenting with"' a patented research tool (using
the invention itself for its intended research purpose).4" 3
The experimental use exemption proposed here makes these
definitional problems less challenging by allowing the same uses of patent
subject matter whether it is classified as an end-user product or process,
or as a research tool. The allowed research uses for all patent subject
matter would include education, scientific research, evaluating patent
specifications, disclosures and claims, improving upon the patent subject
matter, engineering around the patent subject matter, and developing
competing, non-infringing patent subject matter. All patent subject matter
could be used for its intended purpose pursuant to these allowed uses. For
example, an end-user product or process could be used for its intended
purpose to evaluate the patent disclosure and a research tool could be used
for its intended purpose to develop improvements to the research tool or
to create a non-infringing substitute research tool. The one limitation upon
the use of all patent subject matter would be that it could not be used for
its intended purpose in competition with the patentee. In the case of enduser products and processes, and research tools, this means that a person

409. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (detailing "the full range of resources that
scientists use in the laboratory[,]" including "cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal
models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and
cloning tools... methods, laboratory equipment and machines, databases and computer software").
Id.
410. Mueller, supra note 85, at 14.
411. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
412. See supra Part IV.A.2.
413. Strandburg, supra note 11, at 118-21.
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could not make, use, or sell the patent subject matter in a way that results
in direct financial loss to a patentee.
Whether a person's use of patent subject matter falls within the
proposed experimental use exemption would be decided from the
objectively determined purposes of the patent subject matter and the
objectively determined purposes of the person using the patent subject
matter. The objectively determined purposes of the patent subject matter
would be ascertained from such sources as technical papers, and the patent
specifications, disclosures and claims. In order to avoid contrived
assertions of a patent's purposes, only claims enabled in the patent
disclosure would be considered in ascertaining the objective purposes of
the patent. The objectively determined purposes of the person using the
patent subject matter would be ascertained from such sources as lab
notebooks, witness testimony, and expert opinion. If the objectively
determined purposes of the patent subject matter and the objectively
determined purposes of the person using the patent subject matter are the
same, the use would not be allowed under the proposed experimental use
exemption. If the objectively determined purposes of the patent subject
matter and the objectively determined purposes of the person using the
patented subject matter are not the same, the use would be allowed under
the proposed experimental use exemption.
I will illustrate the scope of use allowed under the proposed
414
experimental use exemption using the facts in Madey v. Duke University
and Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA. 415 The objective purpose
of the FEL laser at issue in Madey v. Duke University was the collection
of spectroscopic research data describing the properties of different
materials. 416 Whether or not Duke's use of the FEL laser would fall within
the proposed experimental use exemption would depend upon Duke's
objective purpose in using the FEL laser. If Duke's objective purpose in
using the FEL laser was to obtain spectroscopic research data for inclusion
in a research paper or grant application, the objective purpose of Duke's
use and the objective purpose of the FEL laser would be the same, and the
use would not be allowed under the proposed experimental use exemption.
On the other hand, if Duke's objective purpose was to learn more about
how the FEL laser worked, or to develop a new or improved laser
spectrometer, the objective purpose of Duke's use and the objective
purpose of the FEL laser would not be the same, and the use would be
allowed under the proposed experimental use exemption. If Duke was
successful in developing a new or improved laser spectrometer and the
device included elements covered in the FEL laser patent claims, Duke
414. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
415. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
416. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1353.
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would have to obtain a license to the FEL laser patent before Duke could
make, use, or sell the new or improved device.
The same analysis would be used to decide whether Merck's use of the
RGD peptides at issue in Integra v. Merck would fall within the proposed
experimental use exemption. The objective purpose of the RGD peptide
patents was as a potential therapeutic drug to facilitate wound healing.417
Merck's objective purpose in using the RGD peptides was to research their
potential use in cancer treatment to retard tumor growth. 1 8 Because the
objective purpose of the RGD peptide patents and the objective purpose
of Merck's use of the RGD peptides were not the same, Merck's use
would be allowed under the propsed experimental use exemption. On the
other hand, if the objective purpose of the RGD peptide patents was an
assay to screen compounds that could stimulate the growth of new blood
vessels and Merck somehow used the RGD peptides to screen compounds
that could retard the growth of new blood vessels, Merck's use would not
be allowed under the proposed experimental use exemption. In this case,
Merck's objective purpose in using the RGD peptides as a research tool
and the objective purpose of the RGD peptide patents as a research tool
would be the same, and Merck's use would not be allowed under the
proposed experimental use exemption. In the event that Merck's use was
allowed under the proposed experimental use exemption and Merck was
successful in developing a new drug to retard tumor growth, this new drug
contained peptides covered by the RGD patent claims, Merck would have
to obtain a license to the patents before Merck could make, use, or sell the
newly developed drug.
C. Suggested Statutory Language to Implement the
ProposedExemption
There are many ways in which the language to implement the proposed
experimental use exemption could be drafted. The purpose here is simply
to suggest language that could provide a starting point for further drafting
efforts. The following language would implement the major features of the
proposed asymmetric experimental use exemption.
(1) It shall not be an act of infringement for a non-small
business corporation to make or use patent subject matter
owned by another non-small business corporation for the
purposes of education, scientific research, evaluation of
patent specifications, disclosures or claims, improvement of
patent subject matter, or development of new patent subject

417. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863.
418.byId.
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matter. It shall be an act of infringement for a non-small
business corporation to make or use patent subject matter
owned by a small business corporation or a nonprofit
research organization, as they are defined in this section, for
any purpose without authorization from the small business
corporation or nonprofit research organization. It shall also be
an act of infringement for a non-small business corporation
to use the research results obtained from an exempted use of
patent subject matter under paragraph (2) without
authorization from the patent owner of the exempted patent
subject matter.
(2) It shall not be an act of infringement for a small business
corporation or a nonprofit research organization, as they are
defined in this section, to make or use patent subject matter
owned by a non-small business corporation, a small business
corporation, or a nonprofit research organization for the
purposes of education, scientific research, evaluation of
patent specifications, disclosures or claims, improvement of
patent subject matter, or development of new patent subject
matter.
(3) In determining whether the use of patent subject matter is
exempted from infringement under paragraph (1) or (2), a
court should consider the intended purposes of the patent
subject matter enabled in the patent disclosure and the
intended purposes for which the patent subject matter was
used. Where the intended purposes of the patent subject
matter enabled in the patent disclosure and the intended
purposes for which the patent subject matter was used are not
the same, the use of the patent subject matter is exempted
from infringement under paragraph (1) or (2). Where the
intended purposes of the patent subject matter enabled in the
patent disclosure and the intended purposes for which the
patent subject matter was used are the same, the use of the
patent subject matter is not exempted from infringement
under paragraph (1) or (2).
Of course, the extent to which the proposed experimental use
exemption will advance innovation, competition, and consumer welfare
will depend upon the courts' interpretation of the statutory language,
perhaps many years after the enactment of the exemption. For this reason,
the suggested statutory language seeks to provide courts with clear
guidance on the patented subject matter and allowed uses covered by the
experimental use exemption. Patented subject matter is clearly delineated
between patented subject matter accessible to non-small business
corporations and patented subject matter accessible to small business
corporations and nonprofit research organizations. Furthermore, the
exempted purposes for which patented subject matter can be used are
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explicitly stated, and a simple test is provided to determine whether a
given use of patented subject matter falls within the infringement
exemption.
D. Benefits of the ProposedExemption
1. Promoting Innovation, Competition, and Consumer Welfare
The proposed experimental use exemption would promote innovation,
competition, and consumer welfare in the United States. Corporations
would be free to experiment with one another's patented technologies for
the purposes of education, scientific research, evaluating patent
specifications, disclosures and claims, improving upon patented
technologies, engineering around patented technologies, and developing
competing, non-infringing patented technologies. This would create new
threats and new opportunities for corporations. Corporations that did not
diligently pursue ongoing improvement of their technology would be
vulnerable to competitors' experimentation with their patented technology
to develop superior technology. On the other hand, corporations that
aggressively pursued improvement of their technology would be able to
experiment with their competitors' patented technologies to achieve this
improvement. In either case, technical innovation, market competition, and
consumer welfare would be advanced.
The situation is the same for small technology businesses and nonprofit
research organizations. These entities would also be able to experiment
with one another's technologies and this, in turn, would create new threats
and new opportunities for these entities. For example, small business
corporations would be able to experiment with patented university
technologies to determine what technologies might be most useful to
license, while universities would be able to experiment with the patented
technologies of small businesses to determine how these technologies
might be improved upon or adapted to create new technologies. In this
environment, the successful small businesses and nonprofit research
organizations will be those which are the most able to perform, and the
most committed to pursue, state-of-the-art research and development
projects. Although individual small businesses and nonprofit research
organizations might be more or less successful under the proposed
asymmetric experimental use exemption, the overall result undoubtedly
would be greater technical innovation, increased market competition, and
improved consumer welfare.
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2. Promoting Consistency in Patent Law and Policy
The proposed experimental use exemption would promote consistency
in U.S. patent law and policy in three significant respects. First, as noted
earlier, the lack of a general experimental use exemption in the United
States is at odds with the Patent Act's requirement of an enabling
disclosure in the patent application. 9 The CAFC has often stated that the
§ 112 enabling disclosure is fundamental to the patent system's quid pro
quo in granting a patent monopoly in exchange for information sufficient
to enable one skilled in the art to understand the invention.4 20 However, as
Judge Newman has recognized, in the great majority of instances it is not
possible to understand a patented invention without its physical use. 42' The
adoption of a statutory general experimental use exemption would
reconcile the CAFC' s conflicting decisions on enabling disclosures and the
common law experimental use exemption, and would acknowledge the
reality of contemporary research and development practice.
Second, the lack of a general experimental use exemption is
inconsistent with the case law and regulatory guidelines limiting
anticompetitive expansion of patents through licensing agreements. The
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are increasingly
concerned with maintaining balance between patent law and antitrust
law.422 If firms in a market cannot freely pursue research in competition
with one another, or if firms in a market can leverage ownership of
existing patents to control development of new patent subject matter,
competition is retarded. These are the de facto results of the current patent
law without a general experimental use exemption. Enacting a general
experimental use exemption would bring patent law more in line with
antitrust law and lessen the tension between the two.
Third, the lack of a general experimental use exemption in U.S. law is
in sharp contrast to the patent laws adopted by foreign countries and
promulgated in international agreements. 423 A general experimental use
exemption would harmonize U.S. law with the prevailing international law
and this, in turn, would stop vital research from being conducted outside
the United States in countries that have an experimental use exemption
and place researchers in the United States on an equal footing with their
colleagues in other countries.

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

See supra Part IIl.A.
See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See Integra, 331 F.3d at 873-75 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See supra notes 232-42 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.C.
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3. Promoting Consistency in the Treatment of Patent
Subject Matter
The proposed experimental use exemption would reconcile the
treatment of patented drugs and medical devices and other patented subject
matter, and in doing so would eliminate the complex and anomalous
provisions contained in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Under the HatchWaxman Act, drugs and medical devices are subject to a unique form of
patent infringement.4 24 Although drug makers and medical device
manufacturers are allowed to use patented subject matter to obtain
information necessary for FDA approval of new drugs or medical devices,
the filing of this information in the form of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) or in the form of a request
for Pre-market Approval
4 25
(PMA) constitutes an act of infringement.
Drug makers and medical device manufacturers are also granted a
unique form of infringement remedy: Upon filing an infringement suit, the
plaintiff drug maker or medical device manufacturer is entitled to an
automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval of the alleged infringing
drug or device.4 26 This thirty-month stay of FDA approval is essentially a
thirty-month preliminary injunction that is granted automatically to the
plaintiff drug maker or medical device manufacturer without the need to
prove the four elements required in all other patent infringement suits to
obtain a preliminary injunction. The four elements being (i) that it is likely
the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of the infringement suit, (ii) that the
plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is
denied, (iii) that the harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is
denied is greater than the harm to the defendant, and (iv) that the
preliminary injunction will not have serious adverse impact upon the
public.4 27 Another unique aspect of the infringement remedy under the
Hatch-Waxman Act is that the plaintiff drug maker or medical device
manufacturer cannot recover money damages in the infringement suit
unless the defendant has engaged in commercial sales of the drug or
device.428
The adoption of a general experimental use exemption would abolish
the differential treatment of drugs and medical devices created by the
Hatch-Waxman amendments to the Patent Act and greatly simplify the
424. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000).
425. Id.
426. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (West 2005).
427. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1363,
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (identifying the four factors a moving party must prove to establish the right to a
preliminary injunction).
428. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(4)(c).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

75

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

procedural and substantive law surrounding the development and
commercialization of new drugs and medical devices. The adoption of a
general experimental use exemption, however, would not affect the HatchWaxman amendments to the FDCA allowing drug makers and medical
device manufacturers to use previous clinical trials to establish the safety
and efficacy of a new drug or device.429 This provision of the HatchWaxman Act is necessary to avoid wasting time, money, and effort to
obtain information that is already known. The adoption of a general
experimental use exemption would also not affect the Patent Act
amendments that restore the term of patent protection up to five years to
compensate for time lost during the FDA approval process.43° To the
contrary, the question on patent term restoration is why all inventions
subject to regulatory approval prior to market entry should not receive a
patent term extension for the full period of regulatory review.
4. Improving Patent Quality
The proposed experimental use exemption would lessen the problem
of the issuance of poor quality patents (patents of questionable validity) by
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), which has been noted by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).43 The FTC cites three anticompetitive
consequences that flow from the issuance of poor quality patents: poor
quality patents slow innovation by discouraging firms from conducting
research in an area; poor quality patents necessitate unnecessary licenses
and royalty payments; and poor quality patents impose unnecessary
litigation costs in order to challenge their validity. 32
To address the problem of poor quality patents the FTC has proposed
a number of procedural reforms including enhanced inter partes
reexamination proceedings and allowance of post-grant and pre-grant
challenges to patents.43 3 Whether these proposals will ultimately be
accepted, or succeed in reducing the number of questionable patents
issued, is unclear.434 However, the proposed experimental use exemption
429. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
430. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6).
431.

See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE

POLICY 5-5 (2003), http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/2003/
10/innovationrpt.pdf.
432. Id. at 5-1 to -4.
433. Id. at 5-17 to -18.
434. Indeed, some commentators argue that it is inefficient to dedicate more resources to
improving patent quality at the USPTO, because "most patent applications involve claims of little
economic significance, and... therefore 'it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity
determinations in those few cases [in which patents are challenged] than to invest additional
resources examining patents that will never be heard from again."' Id. at 5-1 (quoting Mark A.
Lemley, RationalIgnoranceat the PatentOffice, 95 N.W. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2001)). However,
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
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would significantly lessen the problem of poor quality patents in two ways
which could also shift the burden for patent scrutiny away from the
overworked PTO examiners.435 First, by allowing the use of patent subject
matter for the purpose of assessing patent specifications, disclosures and
claims, the validity of issued patents will be subject to unprecedented
public scrutiny. More importantly, that scrutiny will come from the very
parties who have a stake in ensuring that their industry is not plagued by
questionable patents. Corporations, which traditionally focus on late-stage
research, will be able to keep each other in check by testing the validity of
their competitors' patents. Similarly, universities and small businesses,
chiefly engaged in basic and early-stage research, will be able to ensure
that patents covering those areas do not unduly hinder the pace of
progress. Second, knowledge that the validity of patents will be scrutinized
by the public at large will cause patent applicants to be far more careful in
drafting and prosecuting patent applications. Patent applicants will know
that resources expended in prosecuting a questionable patent application
might ultimately prove fruitless if their competitors are able to experiment
with the patented invention to show the invalidity of the patent's claims or
the inadequacy of the patent's disclosure.
5. Avoiding the Anti-Commons
A number of writers have expressed concern over the "tragedy of the
anti-commons" in the field of biomedical research.4 36 The tragedy of the
anti-commons is alleged to arise from the high transaction costs
researchers confront when they require access to multiple prior patents in
order to create a single new product or process.43 7 According to the anticommons theory, the upstream, prior patent owners act as "tollbooth[s] on
the road to [new] product development, adding to the cost and slowing the

this commentary misses the practical deterrent effect on innovation that questionable patents create,
namely that innovators might forego research in an area where it is difficult to navigate the patent
landscape and determine the non-infringing course. One commentator reported that, if research is
to continue in the face of these "patent thickets,."'the only practical response to this problem of
unintentional and sometimes unavoidable patent infringement is to file hundreds of patents each
year ourselves."' Id. at 3-35 (quoting statement of Robert Barr (Feb. 28, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/
opp/intellect/barrrobert.doc).
435. To reveal just how overworked the examiners are, consider that the estimated time for
examination of a patent application is between eight and twenty-five hours. Id. at 5-5. This involves
the time necessary to "read and understand the application, search for prior art, evaluate
patentability, communicate with the applicant, work out necessary revisions, and reach and write
up conclusions." Id. Further, the USPTO receives approximately 300,000 applications each year,
id. at 5-4, approximately forty-five percent of which are found to be invalid when fully litigated.
Id. at 5-6.
436. See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 393, at 698.
437. Id. at 699.
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'
If there is an antipace of downstream biomedical innovation."438
commons problem, the proposed experimental use exemption would lessen
it. Corporations, small businesses, and nonprofit research organizations
would be free to experiment with patent subject matter without a license
in order to develop new and improved biomedical products and processes.
Researchers would only have to obtain licenses if the resulting new
products or processes were covered by the claims of prior patents.

6. Reducing Control of Downstream Innovations by
Research Tool Patentees
Likewise, the proposed experimental use exemption would address the
alleged problem of control of downstream innovations by research tool
patentees. 4 One prerequisite for such control by a research tool patentee
is that there does not exist a close substitute for the research tool. 440 The
knowledge that other persons skilled in the field can freely experiment
with a research tool to improve upon it, or to engineer around it, would
motivate research tool patentees to focus on the research tool market and
license their research tools rather than attempt to control new products or
processes that might be developed through the use of their research tools.
VI. CONCLUSION

Adopting a statutory experimental use exemption will require difficult
compromises between the rights of patentees, the rights of patentee
competitors, and the rights of the public. Reaching these compromises will
be difficult due to the growing role of universities in researching,
patenting, and licensing new technologies, the increasing interdependence
of the for-profit and nonprofit sectors in creating new technologies, and
the expanding involvement of small businesses in commercializing new
technologies. Nonetheless, the United States should enact a statutory
experimental use exemption to patent infringement in order to promote
innovation and competition, promote consistency in patent law and policy
and in the treatment of patented subject matter, improve patent quality,
and avoid inefficient barriers to follow-on and downstream research
efforts. The asymmetric experimental use exemption proposed here would
be a fair, effective, and simple way to do this.

438. Id.
439. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 85, at 56.
440. See Strandburg, supra note 11, at 124.
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